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In what ways can persons in a pluralistic democratic society confront, discuss and 
eventually solve their various political problems?  Contemporary deliberative democratic 
theorists like Seyla Benhabib, critically following Jürgen Habermas’s discourse 
ethics, responds to this question by articulating a theory of democratic 
deliberation that appeals to reason and argumentation. Agonistic pluralists such as 
Chantal Mouffe, however, retort that the main problem with this response is its 
excessive rationalism that dismisses the role passion plays in democratic practice. 
Responding in part to the agonistic critique posed by Mouffe, my goals in this 
thesis are as follows: I wish to unpack the nuances within the theory of 
deliberative democracy in order to arrive at a position fairer towards theorists of 
deliberative democracy. Then, I hope to show that both deliberative democratic 
theory and its agonistic critique possess a tendency, which makes each of these 
views susceptible to each other’s criticisms.  
Although often unacknowledged, some of the proponents and critics of 
deliberative democratic theory exhibit an opposition between reason and passion, 
and this leads some of them to either purge rhetoric out from their idea of 
democratic deliberation, or in Mouffe’s case, exaggerate the rational moment in 
her assessment of the theory of democratic deliberation so as to render the theory 
of deliberative democracy fatal to democratic practice. I will show that both sides 
can be caught in this bind. By privileging reason over passion (as in deliberative 
democratic theory’s case) or renouncing reason in favor of passion (as in Mouffe’s 
agonistic critique’s case), they, in turn, do not see the possibility of understanding 
the relationship between political agency and political judgment in synthetic terms.  
In short, in this thesis, I argue that one stumbling block to the question 
initially posed above is a sharp presupposed opposition between reason and 
passion, a by-product of contemporary democratic theory’s reception of the age-
old divide between philosophical speech (dialectic) and persuasive speech 
(rhetoric) in the history of Western democratic thought. I suggest that it is only 
through an adieu to this intellectual legacy, a residue of a tradition which goes all 
the way back to Plato, received by Kant and reflected in the contemporary 
writings of some deliberative democratic theorists and their critics, that we might 
arrive at a more balanced theory of democratic deliberation. As a result of this 
observation in the history of political thought, I defend a view of democratic 
deliberation that envisages democratic reason as a counterpart, and not the 
nemesis of democratic passion: an account of democratic deliberation friendly to 
rhetoric. This account aims to balance the mainstream rationalist account, 
criticized for its failure to entertain alternative forms of political communication 
as it accommodates the agonistic criticism, without necessarily rejecting the 
general theory of deliberative democracy. I support this view through a reading of 
the first chapter of Aristotle’s Tekhne Rhetorike, more famously known as the On 
Rhetoric. I argue that in this philosophically under-assessed work, Aristotle 
provides us with a robust view of rhetoric that can be useful to a theory of 
democratic deliberation through articulating the tripartite pisteis (proofs) of 
persuasion namely ethos, logos, pathos.  
 
  iv
Note on Abbreviations 
 
CC…………………..Claims of Culture 
CE……………..Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy 
DD/AP……………..Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? 
I&D…………………Inclusion and Democracy 
IPRR………………...Idea of Public Reason Revisited 
PL…………………...Political Liberalism 
RHET……………….Rhetoric 
RTP………………….Return of the Political 
TDM…………………Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy 
UD…………………..The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics 
YA……………………In Defense of Universalism 
 
* For complete bibliographical information regarding the books and articles above, see References 
on pp. 95-99 of this thesis. An explanation on every abbreviated book or article also appears in 




































(Socrates) separated the science of wise thinking 
from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they 
are closely linked together…This is the source from 
which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and 
unprofitable and reprehensible severance between 
the tongue (lingua) and the brain (cor), leading to 
our having one set of professors teach us to think 
and another to teach us to speak. 
-Cicero, De Oratore III, xvi 60. 
 
 
1.1. Background of the Study and Statement of the Problem 
In what ways can persons in a pluralistic democratic society confront, discuss and 
eventually solve their various political problems? For the past two decades, numerous 
democratic theorists concentrated their efforts in formulating a solid response to 
this question. Their answer lies within the horizon of the question itself: 
discussion through rational argumentation, or simply, deliberation. This sustained 
interest in the axis between rationality and democratic politics led to what John S. 
Dryzek calls the “deliberative turn” in democratic theory.1  
                                                 
1 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),1-3. Dryzek’s book is a 
helpful introduction to anyone wishing to understand deliberative democracy in 
general. He explains the relationship between aggregative democracy and 
deliberative democracy. Furthermore, he provides a significant discussion of the 
main critics of deliberative democratic theory. He points out at least three main 
groups of theorists critical towards the theory: namely liberal theorists, social-
choice theorists and difference theorists. He also suggests several novel and 
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At the core of this deliberative turn is a belief that rational communication 
among citizens can help illuminate aspects of democratic institutions and practices 
only partially glimpsed and realized through the more traditional ways of making 
and forming democratic decisions. It is primarily a turning away from the 
aggregative model of democracy, the theory of democratic decision-making akin 
to the addition of persons' private and particular interests through voting.2 It can 
also be seen as democratic theory’s “linguistic turn” as deliberative democratic 
theories pay crucial attention to the decisive role of speech and language in 
democratic politics. 3
                                                                                                                                            
provoking theses, such as the widening of the deliberative forum by 
accommodating “non-human political agents” and by paying attention to the 
“transnational” scope and possibilities of democratic deliberation.   
2 It is frequently noted that the aggregative model was primarily inspired by 
the work of Joseph Schumpeter. See for example his seminal work Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). Also worth noting 
is Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1957). I will not elaborate my discussion on this model, but as I say in 
my note above, Dryzek’s book provides a comprehensive comparison of this 
model vis-à-vis deliberative democratic theory.   
3 There are many camps of deliberative theorists of democracy. From the 
early 1990s to the early 2000s, there emerged a considerable amount of literature 
that can be counted as general statements of the theory. The literature, as it stands 
now is legion and this is just a partial list of the ones I consulted for this paper: 
Aside from Dryzek’s Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, he also has an earlier work 
entitled Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) which counts as one of the earliest systematic 
works on the theory. Simone Chamber’s Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and 
the Politics of Discourse. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) is an early 
statement explicitly following Habermas’ discourse ethics. One of the main 
theorists I discuss in this thesis also follows Habermas’ discourse ethics in her 
own model of deliberative democracy. See Seyla Benhabib’s “Toward a 
Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). James Fishkin’s Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for 
Democratic Reforms. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) is also worth looking 
into. Another major statement of theory is Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
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To be sure, as many historians of political thought would quickly warn us, 
the philosophical spirit that shaped some of the central concepts behind 
contemporary deliberative democracy can be historically located in the ancient 
history of democratic thought. The idea of democracy, that is demos kratia, a 
government that puts emphasis on the power of the people to decide its course, 
can be said to have concurrently grown while philosophy was being cultivated in 
fifth century Athens.  
This is not to say that the major Greek philosophers favored democracy as 
the best type of rule. Plato is surely one of the most hostile critics of democracy 
and Aristotle sees it only as the best of the worst of regime-types available. 4 What 
I am saying is that the concepts of reasoned talk and argumentation, which proved 
                                                                                                                                            
Press, 1996). A book symposium on this work is Stephen Macedo’s Deliberative 
Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999). The latest book by Gutmann and Thompson is Why Deliberative Democracy? 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). This book contains several 
responses to the criticisms forwarded in Macedo’s Deliberative Politics, and one of 
their newer lines of argument pertains to the form of political communication 
worth-accommodating in a theory of democratic deliberation is also transformed. 
I shall return to this work and this point of transformation in the last chapter. 
Each theorist has various philosophical presuppositions and intellectual bearings 
and this in part influences their differing views of what ought to consist the 
theory.  
4 I owe this extremely important point to the anonymous “content reader” 
of this thesis. In his comment, he raises the rather important historical fact, which 
Habermas raises at the opening of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: 
“the absence of any public sphere (a private space for the deliberation of public 
ideas) in attic Greece.” He was extremely sensitive to notice that my attribution of 
Ancient democracy as the earliest example of a public sphere was due to my 
Arendtian reading of Greek society. Finally, he raised the critical point that while 
Aristotle and Plato lived in Athens, it is misleading for me to attribute the 
beginnings of deliberative democracy to their writings. To this, I replied above 
that I just see that the term deliberation and its accompanying burden of 
argumentation were concepts that first received theoretical attention and practice 
in the works of both philosophers. I failed to articulate that the marriage of the 
concepts of “deliberation” with “democracy” is a very a contemporary move in 
the history of democratic thought.  
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to be central to the contemporary meaning of the term deliberation initially got 
sharpened in this phase of Western intellectual history. For example, we see in 
Plato’s Socrates, in his dialogues with the citizens of Athens, the significance of 
justifying the truthfulness of one’s beliefs through the public defense of reason in 
the agora. And as this thesis duly explores, we find the relevance of deliberative 
speech in illuminating the ends of our political lives in Aristotle’s practical 
philosophy, as expressed in his often philosophically neglected work, On Rhetoric.  
This deliberative turn, therefore, in a sense, also points us to a re-turn to 
ancient concepts in democratic theory embedded in the long and winding 
tradition of Western political thought.  
However, as we also know from the classical tradition of democratic 
theory, these philosophers rendered a quite uninspiring picture of democracy. 
Albeit in different ways and on varying levels, Plato and Aristotle objected to 
democracy precisely because the demos, according to them, are not entirely capable 
of reasoned argumentation.   
As can be discerned in various statements of deliberative democratic 
theory, implicated in them are numerous and often conflicting assumptions about 
the nature, status and aims of democracy and of course, deliberation itself. And in 
the burgeoning literature on this theory, one major issue that recently caught the 
attention of both its proponents and critics pertains to the form of democratic 
deliberation such a theory ought to endorse. For some of its critics, democratic 
deliberation is very suspicious because it presupposes a rational form of 
argumentation supposedly marginalizing the role passions play in democratic 
societies. This criticism is pointed towards the way mainstream theories of 
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deliberative democracy seem to generally view democratic deliberation: as a 
decision-making process aiming for rational consensus.  
 One of the most consistent critics of deliberative democracy following this 
vein of thought is the political thinker Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe deliberately rejects 
deliberative democracy on the grounds that as a theory, it fails in acknowledging 
that any democratic society is ridden with “irreconcilable conflicts” and 
“antagonisms.” She insists that it is futile to understand democracy in rational 
terms precisely because it would impose violence rather than foster difference in 
our pluralized societies. More than anything, Mouffe's criticism assumes a huge 
hostility against rationality and the philosophical baggage of the Enlightenment. In 
her introduction to a special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism on “Politics and 
Passions,” she makes this clear: 
It is…crucial for democratic theory to grasp the dynamics of 
constitution of those antagonisms instead of wishing them away 
with pious declarations. This requires relinquishing the rationalist 
perspective which predominates in this discipline and which impedes 
acknowledging the complex and ambivalent nature of human 
sociability and the ineradicability of social division. By remaining 
blind to the place of passions in the construction of collective 
political identities, modern political theory has been unable to 
understand that the main challenge confronting democratic politics 
is not to eliminate passions in order to create rational consensus, 
but how to mobilize them toward democratic designs (emphasis 
mine). 5
 
 In her powerful tirade against “modern democratic theory,” Mouffe 
rejects, in toto, the critical axis informing most theories of deliberative democracy: 
the relationship between rationality and politics. According to her, it is dangerous 
to dream that reason can help us solve the problems besetting democratic politics. 
                                                 
5 Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: Introduction”, Philosophy & Social 
Criticism, 28, no. 6 (2002), 615-16.  
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For her, more than reason, passion is key.   
Her criticism, articulated in the terms of her own “agonistic and radical 
pluralist” model of democracy is in tune with the post-modern and post-
structuralist critiques prevalent in most areas of intellectual and political inquiry 
today. It is a testament that at the wake of the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory also comes much skepticism and pessimism about its purportedly utopian 
dimensions: the dream of a rational consensus hoping to serve as the basis of 
solidarity and integration of a democratic society. She posits that the deliberative 
tradition is flawed precisely because it does not acknowledge political society for 
“what it is” but only for “what it should be.” One of her main charges is that this 
type of democratic thinking is not only dissatisfying but more importantly, it is 
impotent because it does not grasp the specificity of “the political.” 6
To a certain extent, one can easily agree with Mouffe’s observation. A 
cursory review of the earliest books and essays instigating the revival of interest in 
deliberative democracy among political theorists shows that most of them 
articulated an attempt to reconcile democratic politics with rationality.7 This is 
                                                 
6 Mouffe is only one among several political theorists who adhere to an 
agonistic conception of democracy. Hannah Arendt is a pivotal thinker in this 
tradition. See, for example her The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958). Bonnie Honig, following Arendt, has also a significant 
account of agonism. See her Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1993). William Connolly also endorses 
agonism. See Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1991). Except for a very brief recourse to 
Arendt’s political thought, I do not discuss any of these other thinkers in this 
thesis. I focus on Mouffe’s version of agonism, which she explicitly endorses as an 
“alternative” to deliberative democratic theory. 
7 See, for example, the collection of essays by James Bohman and William 
Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1997). In the introduction to this book, it was highlighted that the 
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also probably a partial result of these theorists’ philosophical responses to two of 
the foremost architects of this revived tradition: John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas. And Mouffe seems to be correct in pointing this out. However, as I 
will clarify in this thesis, Mouffe does not properly acknowledge that some 
deliberative democratic theorists are aware that passions play a role in democratic 
deliberation. And more importantly, despite their adherence to a general theory of 
deliberative democracy, they do not all agree as to what resolutely constitutes 
democratic deliberation. 
This thesis partially arose as a reaction to the wholesale rejection against 
deliberative democracy forwarded by Mouffe in her writings. I find her dismissive 
stance against the theory somewhat dissatisfying due to its lack of nuanced 
attention towards various views within deliberative democracy. Her criticisms 
sometimes misconceive their aims and misleadingly conflate some of the content 
of their arguments. Also, her writings seem to exhibit a lack of sensitivity to the 
various ways deliberation is defined and characterized within the theory of 
deliberative democracy. I suggest that this rejection be rethought in light of several 
                                                                                                                                            
theoretical debts of deliberative democratic theory to the practical philosophy of 
John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas are tremendous. According to Bohman and 
Rehg, the “major statements” of the idea of deliberative democracy can be culled 
from essays by Habermas like “Popular Sovereignty and Procedure” and Rawls’s 
“The Idea of Public Reason.” They also took note of Jon Elster’s “The Market 
and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory” and Joshua Cohen’s 
“Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” All of these essays are included in 
their edited collection. It is through reading the essays in this book that I came up 
with the idea of “reason and politics” as the main axes of deliberative democratic 
theory. Of course, it is precisely these axes that critics would sooner try to 
dismantle. Like Dryzek’s Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, this is a helpful 
introduction to the idea of deliberative democracy and the philosophical debates 
that surround it.  
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theoretical transformations, for example, of Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
discourse ethics forwarded by other deliberative theorists such as Seyla Benhabib 
and Iris Marion Young.  
It is the general point of my thesis then (1) to unpack the nuances within 
the theory of deliberative democracy further in order to arrive at a fairer position 
towards theorists of deliberative democracy. (2) I also aim to clarify that while a 
theory of deliberative democracy is inextricably bound with a particular theory of 
democratic deliberation, in my view, to achieve a really adequate and sound 
criticism of either, it is important that these two issues be uncoupled from each 
other and judged accordingly. However, my analytical task does not stop in an 
attempt to critically answer Mouffe through the resources of deliberative 
democratic thought. My last general objective is (3) to show that both deliberative 
democratic theory and its agonistic critique are underpinned by a theoretical 
tendency, which makes each of these views susceptible to each other’s criticisms. 
What is this tendency? And where exactly does this third objective lead us?  
Although often unacknowledged, some of the proponents and critics of 
deliberative democratic theory exhibit an opposition between reason and passion, 
and this leads some of them to either purge out (or deny) other forms of 
communication such as “rhetoric” from their idea of democratic deliberation; or 
in Mouffe’s case, exaggerate the rational moment in her assessment of democratic 
deliberation so as to render the theory of deliberative democracy fatal to 
democratic practice. I will show that both sides can be caught in this bind. By 
privileging reason over passion (as in deliberative democratic theory’s case) or 
renouncing reason in favor of passion (as in Mouffe’s agonistic critique’s case), 
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they, in turn, do not see the possibility of understanding the relationship between 
these two spheres of political agency and political judgment in synthetic terms.  
In short, I argue that one stumbling block to the question initially posed 
above is a sharp presupposed opposition between reason and passion, a by-
product of contemporary democratic theory’s reception of the age-old divide 
between philosophical speech (dialectic) and persuasive speech (rhetoric) in the 
history of Western democratic thought. I suggest that it is only through an adieu 
to this intellectual legacy, a residue of a tradition which goes all the way back to 
Plato, received by Kant and reflected in the contemporary writings of some 
deliberative democratic theorists and their critics, that we might arrive at a more 
balanced theory of democratic deliberation.  
As a result of this observation in the history of political thought, I defend a 
view of democratic deliberation that envisages democratic reason as a counterpart 
and not the nemesis of democratic passion: an account of democratic deliberation 
that takes the passions and rhetoric seriously. This account aims to balance the 
mainstream rationalist account, criticized for its failure to entertain alternative 
forms of political communication as it accommodates the agonistic criticism, 
without necessarily rejecting the general theory of deliberative democracy. I 
support this view through a reading of Aristotle’s Tekhne Rhetorike, more simply 
and famously known as On Rhetoric. I argue that in this philosophically under-
assessed work, Aristotle can serve as a guide for us to see (theorize) a more robust 
and holistic view of democratic deliberation. This can be done through retrieving 
and rearticulating the tripartite pisteis (proofs) of persuasion namely ethos, logos, 
pathos, in Aristotle’s defense of rhetoric. As I will show as well, other thinkers 
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within the deliberative tradition support a return to some Aristotelian insights on 
political communication through reading On Rhetoric politico-philosophically. 
 To elucidate the exposition, criticism and my various views, I will proceed 
with four main chapters. Here is my plan: 
 (1) In the second chapter, I begin by introducing Rawls’s idea of public 
reason. Then, I will follow it with an exposition of deliberative democratic theory 
through the model of Seyla Benhabib. I highlight that each time Benhabib 
explains her theory, she severely criticizes Rawls’s idea of public reason. In turn, I 
try to defend Rawls in part. Here, I start to unpack the polyvalence of theoretical 
attitudes among various types of deliberative democratic theorists and what 
differentiates deliberative democratic theory from other democratic theories such 
as Rawls’s liberal democratic model.   
 (2) In the third chapter, we turn to the agonistic critique against 
deliberative democracy forwarded by Mouffe in her writings. Here, I mainly 
discuss her epistemic objection and the philosophical and political bases of her 
concept of agonistic democracy.  
(3) Then in the fourth chapter, contra Mouffe’s agonistic critique, I offer a 
possible response on behalf of the deliberative democratic theorists. Here I will 
focus on Seyla Benhabib’s reconstruction of Habermas’s discourse ethics, the 
foundation of their theories of deliberative democracy. Attention will also be paid 
to Hannah Arendt’s influence over this reconstruction project. Then, I will 
attempt to “think with Benhabib against Benhabib” by discussing a possible 
obstacle to her account of democratic deliberation. 
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 (3) In the fifth chapter, we push our discussion towards the 
philosophy/rhetoric divide, which I argue to be an obstacle in both Benhabib’s 
and Mouffe’s democratic theories. Here, I suggest that the split between 
philosophy and rhetoric can be construed in friendly rather than antagonistic 
terms. This kind of suggestion is definitely not new and has already been offered 
as early as Aristotle’s On Rhetoric. Here, what I recommend is that we improve the 
form of democratic deliberation we have been picturing in this thesis by 
rekindling the interpenetration of the three pisteis (proofs) of persuasion, which 
Aristotle already insightfully explored in this work.   
In sum then, the general problematic and argumentative scope of this 
thesis involves the following: a theory of deliberative democracy, its critical 
dialogue with a stream of liberal thought, its criticism from the vantage point of 
agonistic democracy, a rejoinder from the deliberative point of view and finally, a 
resuscitation of a tradition of communication often cast aside by this kind of 
democratic thinking: rhetoric.  
 
1. 2. Scope, Limitations, Genesis and Methodology of the Study 
 At this juncture, I wish to point out a set of important caveats regarding 
the scope and limitations of this thesis. First of all, I am very much aware that 
Seyla Benhabib’s account is only one among many other models of deliberative 
democracy.8 There exist many other models from other thinkers (mainly from 
disciplines as diverse as philosophy, political science, policy science, law, 
                                                 
8 See my notes 1, 2 and 3 above for a sampling and partial list of the 
literature on deliberative democratic theory.  
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communication and sociology) who have articulated their own theories of 
deliberative democracy. It would be difficult and impossible to track them all 
down in an academic exercise of this length and scope.  
 It is also in this sense that any contemporary student of democratic 
thought cannot ignore deliberative democracy for it certainly dominates the field. 
One can easily discern in the most recent literature attempts of many democratic 
theorists to intermesh or counterpoise their various perspectives with the idea of 
deliberation. In some cases, theorists attempt to use the insights and principles of 
deliberative democratic theory to question how well they work and fit in with their 
own presuppositions and philosophical biases. However, there is also a legion of 
writings on how the deliberative democratic perspective could be “applied” in 
such areas as “public law, international relations, public policy, empirical research 
and identity politics.” As Simone Chambers, in her concise and illuminating article 
“Deliberative Democratic Theory” claims, “deliberative democratic theory has 
moved beyond the ‘theoretical stage’ and into the ‘working theory stage.’” 9
 For Chambers, it is no longer a question of “what deliberative democratic 
theory is,” but “what deliberative democratic theory is doing these days.” 
Chambers says that we have reached a point where the major theoretical 
foundations of deliberative democratic theory have been laid down, and the role 
of the deliberative democratic theorist is showing, so to speak, how the theory 
works. Chambers’ statement signals that deliberative democratic theory is now 
                                                 
9 See Simone Chambers’ “Deliberative Democratic Theory,” Annual Review 
of Political Science, 6 (2003), 302-26. This article is also a good review of the most 
important literature on the subject, a partial list of which I already enumerated in 
the introductory part of this chapter. 
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mature enough to take hold of normative political issues without necessarily 
questioning its main presuppositions—including its genealogy, its permutations in 
the hands of various theoreticians and the many philosophical routes it had taken 
before it arrived at its level of acceptance today.  
 I support and agree with Chambers’ general point above. However, as a 
student of political theory, I also see that there are still crucial questions yet to be 
explicated from the point of view of political thought vis-à-vis the theory of 
deliberative democracy. Needless to say, like many other concepts in the history 
of political thought, the ideas of democracy and deliberation are “essentially 
contested concepts” and their open-ended nature will always subject them to 
theoretical criticism. 10 In short, as long as there are thinkers from various 
persuasions engaged in understanding these concepts, criticisms that would 
eventually demand theoretical responses do not need to stop.  
For example, as I realized while researching for this thesis, the debate 
between deliberative democrats and agonistic pluralists was started and primarily 
constructed by Mouffe in her books On The Political, The Democratic Paradox and 
The Return of The Political and many other individual essays and interviews.  Thus 
far, aside from a few remarks made by Benhabib in her introduction to the book 
Democracy and Difference where one of Mouffe’s articles appears, Benhabib has not 
replied to nor systematically assessed Mouffe’s agonistic critique of deliberative 
democratic theory. Thus, I try to explore how Habermas-inspired theorists of 
deliberative democracy, such as Benhabib and Young would theoretically respond 
                                                 
10 See Walter Bryce Gallie’s “Essentially Contested Concepts”, in W.B. 
Gallie, Philosophy and Historical Understanding, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1964), 
157-91.  
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to Mouffe’s scathing remarks. In a way, this thesis belongs to recent attempts to 
begin a constructive dialogue between these two bodies of political thought, both 
of which have separately become linchpins of hotly contested debates in 
democratic theory today.11  
 My next point covers the intellectual genesis of this thesis.  
Albeit written in a straightforwardly theoretical fashion, this began as a 
project hoping to illuminate some basic questions I have been struggling with for 
a few years now, both as a student of political thought and as a citizen of a 
particular democratic community. Most of my earlier questions that allowed this 
thesis to take shape mainly pertain to the status of democracy as practiced in my 
native homeland, the Philippines. While I do not explicitly discuss the empirics of 
Philippine democratic practice, it is the intent to understand how and why 
democracy works and does not work in the Philippines that guided my politico-
theoretical inquiry through and through. 
My initial aim was simple: to understand what kind of democratic theory 
would best improve democratic practice in the Philippines. However, as I went 
deeper into my research, I gradually realized that this simple question demands an 
                                                 
11 There are several recent scholarly articles that have already explored the 
tensions between deliberative democratic theory and agonistic pluralism. For such 
articles, see especially Ilan Kapoor, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic 
Pluralism? The Relevance of the Habermas-Mouffe Debate for Third World 
Politics”, Alternatives 27 (2002), 459-487. Also, see recent articles by Simona Goi, 
“Agonism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Abortion” in Polity 37, No. 1 (2005), 
54-81. John Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies”, Political 
Theory 33 No.2 (2005), 218-242 and Robert W.T. Martin “Between consensus and 
Conflict: Habermas, Post-modern Agonism and the Early American public 
sphere” in Polity 37, no.3 (2005), 365-388. I acknowledge these essays, especially 
Dryzek’s as my driving forces to think critically on the relationship between 
deliberative democracy and agonism at large.  
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extremely complex response that cannot be encapsulated in a one-size-fits-all 
formula or in a short academic exercise such as this. In addition, the more I 
thought about the multifarious angles of my questions, it became more apparent 
that I should tailor the scope of this thesis around the central questions being 
fought in the field of democratic theory instead, rather than seek for a model for 
the Philippines without carefully studying many extraneous conditions making 
such a model fully justified. Such a constellation of conditions exists and cannot 
be ignored: the long history of religious and political strife in Southern 
Philippines, the economics of poverty, multiple colonialisms (with the democratic 
form of government as a result of American imperialism from the early 1900’s to 
the early 1950’s for example) and of course the unpredictable drama of Philippine 
realpolitik and its accompanying burdens, with the culture of corruption and a 
present crisis of leadership topping many other concerns.  
 With these considerations in mind, I decided that this thesis could better 
be pursued in the method and tradition of political theory and a close reading of 
texts of political and democratic theorists. While my hope for illuminating some 
aspects of Philippine democracy remains undiminished, this thesis will not be able 
to capture either the depth or the breadth of issues pertinent to Philippine 
democracy as I initially desired. I hope to engage in this project perhaps later, 
when I am better equipped with the social scientific skills required in 
accomplishing such a task thoroughly and when my insights about the nature of 
democracy and the Philippines deepen and mature.  
A few words about the methodology I employed herein are in order.  
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Seyla Benhabib claims that it is important to be aware of the presence of 
different voices in a text. For her, reading is not a solitary act but a dialogue on 
reading and interpretation with the author speaking in the text as well as a wider 
community. In reference to designating interpretations to Hannah Arendt’s 
multivalent political theory, for example, she writes:  
Reading is a dialogue between the author, the reader, and the 
community of past and present interpreters with whom one is in 
dialogue, all reading is polyphonic; it is perhaps less like an ordered 
conversation than a symphony of voices.12
 
Moreover, in the introduction to her book The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt, Benhabib gives a striking justification of her position in relation to 
method and interpretation in political theory. Her account is worth quoting in full, 
as it would enlighten the reader as to my own readings of various works within 
political theory at large and democratic theory in particular:   
In general, to understand another’s thought and to evaluate its 
cogency, it is necessary to know the questions and puzzles a thinker 
seeks to answer. To understand these questions and puzzles, in 
turn, it is necessary to reconstruct those social, historical, personal 
and conceptual contexts that form a horizon of inquiry for a 
thinker. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has shown, the reconstruction of 
past arguments and theories always involves a “fusion of horizons.” 
Understanding always means understanding within a framework 
that makes sense for us, from where we stand today. In this sense, 
learning the questions of the past involves posing questions to the 
past in the light of our present occupations. The reconstruction and 
interpretation of another’s thought is a dialogue in which one asks a 
question, seeks to comprehend whether this question is meaningful 
for the other, listens and reformulates the answer of the other, and, 
in light of this answer, rearticulates one’s original position. Every 
interpretation is a conversation, with all the joys and dangers that 
conversations usually involve: misunderstandings as well as ellipses, 
innuendos as well as surfeit of meanings. 13
                                                 
12 See Seyla Benhabib’s The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996),198.  
13 Ibid, xxxiv. 
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As much as this thesis is about my reading of various texts of political and 
democratic theorists, it is also a meeting of the realities that we concurrently share 
and not share. Through their texts and ideas, I was able to see where they stand 
vis-à-vis politics. This attempt to engage them in dialogue is one way of re-
evaluating their ideas from an-other’s eyes, from a different angle of the world. 
And I acknowledge a strong affinity to some of these polylogues, because of their 
power to illuminate and make sense of some of the political realities from where I 
stand.   
In the process of seeking insights from political theory, I realized a 
paradox: while its language is widely encompassing it also speaks on particular 
political issues. This language of universality enables one to give one’s ideas form 
in a historicized way without falling in the traps of parochialism or myopia. Giving 
meaning to politics through political theory, however, does not simply mean 
laying down a clear-cut framework to a particular set of realities ala a procrustean 
bed, that is, producing cookie-cutter analyses of political issues from the lens of a 
theorist. This is why my position as the subject engaging in this reflection is 
deeply crucial. As political theory gets re-thought against each subject’s historical, 
cultural, socio-psychological and philosophical Weltanschauung, both the subject 
and the theories she studies experience fundamental shifts and changes. 
Through the analyses of some key concepts in the history of political and 
democratic thought, I hope to show the importance of bringing to the fore and 
confronting democratic issues at the level of theory, for it is in this terrain that 
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certain analytical distinctions, meanings, interpretations and revaluations are made 
and re-thought; and as such, could eventually affect democratic practice.  
However, I wish to reiterate that while I primarily touch on the subject of 
deliberative democracy and its critique in a theoretical vein, I am also mindful of 
the many hurdles inherent in the perplexing world of democratic practice. 
Ultimately then, the intention behind these readings is not merely to reconstruct 
the meanings we can tease out of these writings, but to genuinely grapple with the 
relationship between democratic reason and passion in actual and particular 



















THE DELIBERATIVE TURN IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 
 
2. 1. The Rawls-Benhabib Debate Over the Idea of Public Reason 
 In his article “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and 
Habermas in Dialogue,” Thomas McCarthy attempts to arbitrate a fruitful 
philosophical conversation between two of the most influential political 
philosophers of the twentieth century.14 He notes at the essay’s beginning that this 
conversation has long been postponed primarily because of the split between 
Anglo-American Analytic and European Continental philosophies in North 
America, where interests in their theories had flourished significantly in the last 
two decades.  However, this split, while a thorny issue in American philosophical 
academia, can be bracketed momentarily if we return to these two theoreticians’ 
common point of departure: Immanuel Kant. As acknowledged by Mc Carthy and 
by Rawls and Habermas themselves in their various writings, they both share a 
profound indebtedness to Kant’s practical philosophy.15
                                                 
14 See Thomas McCarthy’s “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: 
Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue”, Ethics, Vol. 105, No. 1 (Oct., 1994), pp. 44-63. 
McCarthy’s essay is pivotal for my understanding of the relationship between the 
political and moral thought of Rawls and Habermas. It was after encountering this 
essay that I began to think about the many veins of their debate; some of which 
fork in the writings of deliberative democratic theorists such as Seyla Benhabib.  
15 In general, they both derive from Kant’s practical philosophy as Mc 
Carthy and many other commentators like Kenneth Baynes and Seyla Benhabib 
argue. See Kenneth Baynes The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls and 
Habermas (New York: SUNY Press 1992) and Seyla Benhabib Critique, Norm and 
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Kant’s influence over Rawls’s and Habermas’s accounts of practical reason 
is pervasive and it can serve as a trajectory through which we can analyze how 
their debates take place. However, it should be noted that in addition to Kant’s 
influence, they also took the debates over Kantian ideas such as “public reason” 
to a new plane, as they struggle with deep societal and political problems of our 
times, such as those posed by pluralism and cultural diversity. Habermas, for 
example, is very much credited for instigating philosophical interest over 
deliberation in democratic thought and practice, making him one of the chief 
architects of deliberative democratic theory. His theory of communicative action 
and his notion of the public sphere serve as pivotal linchpins of contemporary 
accounts and debates on how to think about the formation of a well-ordered 
democratic society. Likewise, Rawls, through the publication of his book Political 
Liberalism, clarified how we can sustain a stable political society in the age of 
pluralistic and conflicting metaphysical (philosophical) and religious doctrines 
through his theory of liberal democracy.   
 As I make clear in this chapter, we also see in Seyla Benhabib’s writings a 
contiguous vein of this debate between Habermas and Rawls. In fact, one can 
easily discern that in most of her essays on deliberative democratic theory, which 
she often claims to be inspired by Habermas’s discourse ethics, she always 
allocates a portion in distinguishing what makes it a more tenable option over 
Rawls’s idea of public reason.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1986). 
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Before going further, I wish to make a few remarks on placing Rawls side-
by-side with Habermas, (or in the case of this chapter, Benhabib) on deliberative 
democratic issues.  First, at the outset, it may appear misleading, even incorrect, to 
categorize Rawls as a deliberative democratic theorist. Rawls is more known 
among philosophical circles as one of the staunchest defenders of liberalism, 
especially political liberalism and liberal democracy. However, partly due to his 
debate with Habermas, Rawls was able to reconsider his position. For example, he 
eventually admitted in his essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” that he 
endorses deliberative democratic theory, albeit framed in his own set of 
philosophical presuppositions. Thus, it also seems not entirely inappropriate to 
consider his later writings as contributions to the burgeoning literature on 
deliberative democratic thought. As I also highlighted earlier, many anthologies 
introducing deliberative democratic theory feature Rawls as one of its chief 
architects.  
However, Simone Chambers suggests in her essay “Deliberative 
Democratic Theory” in the section “Who is a Deliberative Democratic Theorist?” 
that while Rawls “joined the deliberative turn” as he admits in The Law of Peoples 
that he was “concerned with a well-ordered constitutional democracy . . . 
understood also as a deliberative democracy,” we cannot quickly give Rawls the 
title “deliberative democrat” for this will make deliberative democratic theory an 
extremely wide theoretical field than it actually is. 16  
 
                                                 
 16 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1999), 139. 
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It becomes obvious then that whether we ought to consider Rawls as a 
“deliberative democratic theorist” or not is an open question. My opinion in this 
debate is somewhere in the middle: that we can treat Rawls’s ideas as pivotal in 
understanding the theory of deliberative democracy while maintaining that he 
does not paint a theory of deliberative democracy per se, as Habermas and 
Benhabib straightforwardly does in their writings. More importantly, while he 
eventually saw deliberation as central to his theory of liberal democracy, his theory 
corresponds to issues different from the ones articulated by the more deliberate 
“deliberative democratic theorists.” I hope that these various divergences become 
clearer in the next few parts of this chapter. 17
 
2.2. Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason  
Rawls’s political turn from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism marked a 
substantial change in his idea of public reason. He acknowledges this in the 
conclusion of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” He says that the “two 
books are asymmetrical, though both have an idea of public reason.” In the first, 
“public reason is given by a comprehensive liberal doctrine”, while in the second, 
“public reason is a way of reasoning about political values shared by free and 
equal citizens that does not trespass on citizen’s comprehensive doctrines so long 
as those doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity.” He argues that the 
well-ordered constitutional democratic society of Political Liberalism is “one on 
which the dominant and controlling citizens affirm and act from irreconcilable yet 
                                                 
17 See Simone Chambers’ “Deliberative Democratic Theory,” Annual 
Review of Political Science, 6 (2003), 308. 
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reasonable comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines in turn support reasonable 
political conceptions—although not necessarily the most reasonable—which 
specify the basic rights, liberties, and opportunities of citizens in society’s basic 
structure.” (IPRR, 614)  
 In this light, Rawls suggests that “a well-ordered society will have a wide 
agreement on principles of political justice.” And an overlapping consensus of 
“comprehensive views” supports this agreement. A part of this is a principle of 
public reason for public political advocacy about constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice. For him, the basis of political life should be “more or less 
agreed upon,” and set outside ordinary political power struggle. One possibility 
for this to happen would be if everyone subscribed to the same religious or other 
comprehensive view; and if everyone had a similar opinion of that view’s 
consequence for politics. This possibility, however, faces the obstacle of the 
inevitable plurality of comprehensive views. Still, since people with different 
comprehensive views might share similar ideas about political justice, a consensus 
on the basic political structure of society remains a possibility. It is this possibility 
that Rawls’s theory examines, and where his idea of public reason rests.18
Now we turn to the other philosophical presuppositions of Rawls’s idea of 
public reason.19 Rawls strictly imposes a “definite structure” to it, and sees every 
                                                 
18 Ken Greenawalt, “On Public Reason”, Chicago-Kent Law Review 69: 669 
(1994): 671-674. I am grateful to Greenawalt for clarifying the basic structure of 
Rawls’s argument. Rawls himself acknowledges Greenawalt for contributing to the 
shaping of his own conceptions. 
19 For this section, I will be using two main sources interchangeably. The 
first source is Rawls’s Lecture VI, “The Idea of Public Reason,” in Political 
Liberalism, and an updated version of it in his Collected Papers and The Law of Peoples 
entitled “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” The structure and main 
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aspect as indispensable. One of the most important features of this idea is that it is 
a “reason of citizens sharing equal citizenship”. Rawls says that public reason is 
characteristic of a democratic people: “it is the reason of its citizens, of those 
sharing the status of equal citizenship.” He argues further that the “subject of 
their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice 
requires of society’s basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends 
they are to serve.” Public reason then, for Rawls, is “public in three ways: as the 
reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of 
the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public, 
being given by the ideals and principles expressed by society’s conception of 
political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis.” (PL, 213) 
The idea also claims that justification in public reasons “appeal only to 
presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common 
sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not 
controversial.” (PL, 224). Therefore, when we employ public reason we do not 
“appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines, but rather ‘a 
reasonable balance of public political values.” (PL, 243) 
One considerable aspect of Rawls’s idea of public reason is his suggestion 
that the work of the Supreme Court exemplifies the use of public reason, and that 
is the “sole reason” it exercises (PL 235); for everyone else, the obligation to use 
public reason is less constricting. Aside from the Supreme Court, Rawls considers 
                                                                                                                                            
arguments of the two sources are basically the same, save for a few details, which 
is not part of this paper’s concerns. From hereon, I shall use IPRR to pertain to 
the essay “Idea of Public Reason Revisited” in Rawls’s Collected Papers, and PL to 
pertain to his book Political Liberalism. 
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those who engage in socio-political advocacy in the public forum, and for 
candidates and elections to hold the idea of public reason. For Rawls, therefore, 
the use of public reason and to whom it does apply follows very strict criteria. The 
use of public reason does not apply to all political deliberations of fundamental 
questions but only to questions that he refers to as essential to the “public political 
forum”, which he sees as divided in three parts: “the discourse of judges in their 
decisions, and especially of the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of 
government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and finally, the 
discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, especially 
in their public oratory, party platforms, and political statements.” (IPRR, 575) 
This delimitation tells us that the idea of public reason does not apply to 
personal deliberations and reflections, or to reasoning within associations such as 
universities or churches, where religious, philosophical and moral considerations 
of many kinds properly play a role (PL 215). In conjunction with this, he imposes 
another delimitation. He says that for citizens and legislators, “the limits imposed 
by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving 
what we may call “constitutional essentials” and questions of basic justice. (PL 
214) 
Rawls expects that values specified by a fundamental political conception 
will give a reasonable public answer to all, or nearly all, questions about 
constitutional essentials, and that there is “an urgency for citizens to reach 
practical agreement in judgment about the constitutional essentials”. By 
constitutional essentials, he means two kinds: “fundamental principles that specify 
the general structure of government and the political process: the powers of the 
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legislature, executive and the judiciary; the scope of majority rule and equal basic 
rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect such as 
the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of 
thought and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.” (PL, 227) 
Conceptually speaking, these categorizations and delimitations seem clear, 
especially for the purpose of identifying the presuppositions of Rawls’s idea of 
public reason as a possible “mode of consensus” in a pluralistic democratic 
society. However, Rawls’s ideas pose certain philosophical and sociological 
problems pertinent to encouraging “participation” and “deliberation” in a 
democracy that, as we would see in the next section, Seyla Benhabib, following 
Jürgen Habermas, would seriously consider.  
 
2.3. Benhabib’s Deliberative Democratic Theory 
Seyla Benhabib develops a vision of deliberative democracy based on a 
discourse theory of ethics. 20 In her last two books, The Claims of Culture and The 
Rights of Others, she reiterates this vision. She invites us to see how deliberative 
democracy may serve as a principle of democratic governance that in turn may 
help solve tussles plaguing democratic polities. In The Claims of Culture, Benhabib 
                                                 
20 The references to Benhabib’s thought and her presentation of her 
deliberative democratic model can be traced in the following work: The Claims of 
Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002) especially in its fifth chapter entitled: “Deliberative Democracy and 
Multicultural Dilemmas”. This chapter was developed from her previous writings 
which include: “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy” in 
Democracy and Difference (1996) and “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the 
Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas” in Situating the Self (1992). For the 
purposes of this paper, I shall refer to the fifth chapter of The Claims of Culture, 
and use CC as a tool for citation. 
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readily admits that she privileges a conception of democracy that is deliberative. 
She says that: 
Democracy…is best understood as a model for organizing the 
collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of a 
society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-
being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure 
of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as 
moral and political equals. (CC, 105) 
 
This deliberative conception of democracy, which she also calls “discursive 
democracy” at other times, provides the groundwork for her model. For her, one 
of the foundations of legitimacy in a democracy is that its political institutions 
represent the interests of all. She holds that public opinion should play a part in 
determining public policies and laws, and it is the process of rational deliberation 
in the public sphere that allows for a thorough grasp of the needs, interests and 
desires of the public and, in the cases she addressed in the book, cultural claims of 
persons and groups. Her approach uses elements that derive from Habermas’s 
model of discourse ethics, which she takes as her “meta-norm”. By a meta-norm, 
she means, a “rule of action, interaction, or organization”. (CC, 106) 
She teases out two presuppositions from this meta-norm and calls them 
“principles”. A principle is a general moral proposition, such as “Do not inflict 
unnecessary conflict” or “Citizens must be treated equally”. She also highlights 
that a principle can have as many normative concretizations as possible, and that 
the same set of principles may be used for different instances and institutions. She 
defines two principles underlying the Habermasian model of discourse ethics as 
the following: (1) “universal moral respect” and (2) “egalitarian reciprocity”. (CC, 
107) The first principle requires us to "recognize the rights of all beings capable of 
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speech and action to be participants in the moral conversation" and the second 
principle states that "within discourses each (participant) should have the same 
right to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, and to ask for justification of 
the presuppositions of the conversation, and the like". (CC, 19)   
Aside from her general stance (deliberative democracy) and the norms and 
principles she offers, what delineates her approach from others is that it is a dual-
track model. She places importance both on the “informal, de-centered and 
interlocking network of informal public spheres in civil society” and the “formally 
organized political public spheres of the state.” 21 Interestingly, the two foci of her 
approach are usually seen as contradicting political spheres, the former usually 
represented by “political activities and struggles of social movements, associations 
and groups in civil society” and the latter by “established institutions like the 
judiciary and the legislature.” (CC, 106) 22
In Benhabib’s account, these two spheres complement each other and in 
The Claims of Culture, she shows how both should be able to inform each other 
when multicultural issues are at stake. This is where, as she claims, her model 
departs from and is in contrast with other models like that of John Rawls’s ideas 
                                                 
21 This delineation parallels Habermas’ notion of weak and strong publics. 
See his Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996) According to Habermas, weak 
publics are vehicles of public opinion, uncoupled from the formal decision-
making bodies of government. “Taken together, they form a ‘wild’ complex that 
resists organization as a whole” (Habermas 1996, 307). Strong publics, on the 
other hand, are formal entities, such as sovereign parliaments, that seek out 
cooperative solutions to practical problems. Strong publics justify “the selection 
of a problem and the choice among competing proposals for solving it.” (ibid.) 
22 From where I see it, these two spheres can also represent the tension 
between particular passions (born out of collective identifications to particular 
cultures and ethnic, national and religious particularities) and public reason 
(established in democratic societies’ legal and political institutions). 
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of public reason and overlapping consensus.  
Benhabib specifies three aspects where her deliberative democratic model 
diverges from the Rawlsian model of public reason and overlapping consensus. 
Benhabib summarizes them as follows:  
First, the deliberative model does not restrict the agenda of public 
conversation: in fact, it encourages discourse about the lines 
separating the public from the private; second, the deliberative 
model locates the public sphere in civil society, and is much more 
oriented the ways in which political processes and the “background 
culture” interact; and finally, while the Rawlsian model focuses upon 
“final and coercive political power,” the deliberative model focuses 
upon non-coercive and non-final processes of opinion formation in 
an unrestricted public sphere. (CC, 109) 
 
It is interesting that while Rawls and Benhabib can be seen as endorsing 
deliberation (mutual exchange of reasons in public) as important in a theory of 
democracy, they differ in the way they see the relationship between the public and 
the private: a distinction which presupposes each other’s take on public reason, 
which is also pertinent to the relationship between reason and passion.  For 
Benhabib, the line separating the public and the private is always shifting and 
contestable. She notes that some issues that were previously conceived as private 
can become public matters. Thus, issues assigned as essentially private or primarily 
public should always be put in question. Like Benhabib, other liberal thinkers 
aside from Rawls, remind us of the importance of questioning this distinction. 
However, the main difference between Benhabib’s constant questioning of the 
lines between the public and the private, and that of a liberal like Rawls, is the 
latter’s stress on creating a certain form of closure to this questioning; that is, 
really drawing a line between the public and the private. For example, Judith 
Shklar holds the view that: 
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(Liberalism) must reject only those political doctrines that do not 
recognize any difference between the spheres of the personal and 
the public. Because of the primacy of tolerance as the irreducible 
limit on public agents, liberals must always draw such a line. This is 
not historically a permanent or unalterable boundary, but it does 
require that every public policy be considered with this separation in 
mind and consciously defended as meeting its most severe current 
standard. The important point for liberalism is not so much where 
the line is drawn, as that it be drawn, and that it must under no 
circumstance be ignored or forgotten.23
 
In Rawls’s account, this particular liberal emphasis was also made, as we 
see in his notion of public reason that clearly lays down what divides public from 
non-public issues. It is on this emphasis that Benhabib’s misgiving might find a 
response from Rawls. For Rawls, as Benhabib herself noted, public reason is a 
regulative principle. It imposes “certain standards upon how individuals, 
institutions, and agencies ought to reason about public matters.” (PL, 220) 
However, it is important to note that Rawls gives a further distinction by 
saying that: “The public vs. nonpublic distinction is not the distinction between 
public and private.” (PL, 220). This is in cognizance with his claim that “there is 
no such thing as private reason” in the sense of private reason as an 
individualistic stance without a link to any association in civil society. Rather, he 
assigns the term “non-public” to the various forms of reasoning that can be 
found in different associations in civil society or the “background culture”, which 
should be distinguished from the reason used in the public political culture that 
he ascribes to his idea of public reason. (PL, 220)  
 
                                                 
23 See these comments by Judith Shklar in her article “The Liberalism of 
Fear” in Liberalism and Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989. p. 24. 
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At this point, it would be good to consider how Benhabib’s point of 
departure and devices of representation differ from Rawls’s. This fissure is 
possibly the reason why the two will never arrive at the same conception of the 
public use of reason and that Benhabib might be asking Rawls to fill a lacuna that 
he never pursued in the first place. For example, Benhabib is very well persuaded 
of Habermas’s model of the public sphere and its location in civil society. And 
she wants to assert that sociologically speaking, this is a more plausible position 
than Rawls’s. Let us note, however, that Rawls never intended to complement or 
even contrast his idea of public reason with that of Habermas’s public sphere. 
Rawls tried to clarify this himself on a footnote of his “Reply to Habermas”: 
The public reason of political liberalism may be confused with 
Habermas’s public sphere but they are not the same. Public reason 
in PL is the reasoning of legislators, executives (presidents, for 
example) and judges (especially those of a supreme court, if there is 
one). It includes the reasoning of candidates in political elections 
and of party leaders and others who work in their campaigns, as well 
as the reasoning of citizens when they vote on constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice. The ideal of public reason does not 
have the same requirements in all these cases. As for Habermas’s public 
sphere….the background culture, public reason with its duty of 
civility does not apply. We agree on this. I am not clear whether he 
accepts this ideal (129-30). Some of his statements in FG (see 18, 84, 
152, 492, 534f) certainly suggest it and I believe it would not be 
consistent with his view, but regrettably I cannot discuss the 
question here (emphasis mine). 24
 
In raising such differences, Benhabib might give her readers the impression 
that those two conceptions should fulfill the same requirements.  It might be the 
case, rather, that the notion of public sphere is an idea that should not necessarily 
                                                 
24 See footnote 13 in Rawls’s Reply to Habermas in Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism. FG refers to Faktizitat und Geltung, which was later translated by 
William Rehg as Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, a book I already mentioned in a previous note. 
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be contrasted against Rawls’s public reason as Rawls himself suggests—because 
the requirements that his idea tries to fulfill would certainly fail the requirements 
of the public sphere in Habermas’s account that Benhabib prioritizes. Thus, 
Benhabib’s assessment of the differences of her model and that of Rawls’s may 
also appear a little overdrawn because Rawls’s idea of public reason is simply 
trying to serve a different purpose.  
However, if we understand her attack as trying to enlarge the scope and 
role of public reason from what Rawls originally conceived it to be, then it is 
justifiable why she keeps making this line of criticism in the first place: if we 
extend the realm of public reason to civil society, we will be able to entertain more 
persons participating in crucial public fora and decision-making processes. 
Following this vein, the liberal constraints that Rawls imposed in his idea of public 
reason are over-ridden by the need to capture the spirit of the public more fully, 
the true demos which makes democracy a government by the people in the first 
place.  
Of course, there is an alternative interpretation of this debate that will be 
more charitable to Rawls: we can claim that while it appears in Benhabib’s 
criticism of Rawls’s idea of public reason that he under-appreciated the role of 
civil society in the political public sphere, it could also be interpreted otherwise—
that Rawls’s account, in fact, gives civil society actors further autonomy as to the 
direction and content of their discussion, which could be understood as Rawls’s 
reason for assigning their discourses as “non-public.” In this interpretation, we 
can understand Rawls as denying that they could not participate in the discussions 
(as Benhabib’s critique might signal) but rather, civil society actors should be 
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aware whether the issues they are trying to assert and discuss would be something 
that deserve an elevation to the public realm, or whether the issue could be 
pushed as an agendum that deserves political action. They could then, as Rawls 
might possibly suggest at this point, shift their “non-public” uses of reason to a 
public use of reason.   
In my view, the challenge for both civil society actors and the state is to 
constantly check whether the needs that the latter addresses are what the former 
actually desire. On this point, I cannot but stress that in this challenge, the dual 
character of Benhabib’s deliberative democratic model is very illuminating. Even 
so, I do not see clearly why contrasting it against Rawls’s idea of public reason 
proves something aside from creating and collapsing distinctions that, as we saw 
in the foregoing, Rawls did not intend to make.25  
The debate between Rawls and Benhabib, which re-echoes the debate 
between Rawls and Habermas, compounds at least two issues: First, Rawls and 
Benhabib and do not share the same conception of the public/private divide and 
this has significant effects in the way they view public reason and deliberation. 
Second, that it is necessary to render a nuanced reading of the particular issues 
where democratic theorists disagree. If we do not pay enough attention, for 
                                                 
25 At one point in the Claims of Culture, Benhabib quotes from Hannah 
Arendt’s The Human Condition. She says that, according to Arendt, “The laws, as 
the ancients knew, are the walls of the city, but the art and passions of politics 
occur within those walls.” (CC, 130)  In her deliberative democratic model, 
Benhabib shows us the primacy of the spaces within the walls, the endless talk and 
discussion, the art and the passion that makes political engagement in the civil 
societal public sphere colorful and alive. However, it is the virtue of Rawls’s idea 
of public reason that it can act as that strongly built wall, which serves as refuge 
when all has been said and we want something to be done.   
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example, to Rawls’s thin concept of publicity, we might not see that its merit lies 
precisely in its limitedness. And as I extrapolated previously, it also has the 
capacity to allow civil society to go on with their own business without 
undermining the importance of institutional actors such as the state, the judiciary 
and other legal institutions. Finally, we cannot simply conflate Rawls with 
Habermas or Benhabib as a “deliberative democratic theorist.” While Rawls 
endorses important insights useful to a theory of deliberative democracy, his ideas 
are still very much entrenched in the liberal tradition. 
In the next chapter, I discuss several perennial objections against the 
deliberative democratic theory from the point of view of Chantal Mouffe’s 
agonistic democracy. A chapter shall succeed this where I continue to engage with 
deliberative democratic theory as stated by Seyla Benhabib, following Jürgen 
Habermas’s discourse ethics. In this fourth chapter, I also show their divergences 
in order to partially respond to the objections set by Chantal Mouffe. As I already 
began highlighting here, this shall further amplify the polyvalence of the 
deliberative tradition within the field of democratic theory by showing that even 
deliberative democratic theorists such as Seyla Benhabib, Jürgen Habermas and 
Iris Marion Young who seemingly follow the same train of philosophical thought 









THE AGONISTIC CRITIQUE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
 
3.1. Chantal Mouffe and the Rage Against Public Reason 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the critical vocabulary informing the 
theory of deliberative democracy includes the idea of public reason as debated 
between John Rawls and Seyla Benhabib. At this point, we turn to another thread 
of political thought, which attacks this mode of theorizing and its accompanying 
idiom. This attack targets both the theorists I just recently assessed. It is also a 
symptom of how our recent intellectual history is replete with attacks on 
rationality, especially in its supposedly most suspicious form: universal reason.  
From feminists to post-colonial theorists to various critics of 
Enlightenment philosophy, we have variously heard that universal reason is an 
inherently Western, patriarchal construct that poses violence in the face of the 
Other/others. These criticisms are abundant and they also become salient in the 
politico theoretical front, especially when democratic issues in pluralistic societies 
are at stake. That is why it almost comes as a surprise that against this tide of 
disillusionment with reason, the literature on deliberative democratic theory 
flourished.  
The paradox of our contemporary political situation seems to lie in gaining 
a new sense of hope in reason while living at the wake of its supposedly 
proclaimed death. However, among those who continuously choose to remain 
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suspicious of this newfound hope in reason is political thinker Chantal Mouffe. 
She stands out as one of the most ardent and vocal critics of deliberative 
democracy. She takes issue with the conception of politics that informs a great 
deal of democratic thought today which she simply sees as rationalist, 
universalistic and individualist. 
 
3.2. The Epistemic Objection  
Chantal Mouffe’s strong remarks against the deliberative tradition appear in 
almost every major book and article she authored over the last two decades. The 
reiterations of her arguments vary in depth and in purpose but they still hold the 
same objections against deliberative democratic theory, which I shall discuss 
below.26
Mouffe’s primary publications have revolved around the idea of radical 
democracy and agonistic pluralism, projects conceived in the last sections of 
Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy, her famous collaborative work with Ernesto 
Laclau. In her latest book, On The Political, Mouffe reiterates what seems to be the 
leitmotif of her political thought for the past two decades: an attempt to move 
away from rationalist politics in order to elevate the role passions play in our 
                                                 
26 Mouffe’s books, where attacks on rationalistic theories of democracy, 
where she takes deliberative democracy as exemplary can be traced, include: The 
Return of the Political, (London ; New York: Verso, 1993), The Democratic Paradox, 
(London ; New York: Verso, 2000.) and On The Political, (New York: Routledge, 
2005). These works often overlap and is very prone to repetition, which Mouffe 
herself admits in the introduction to Democratic Paradox as part of her theoretical 
strategy. An important essay is Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy, which 
served as Mouffe’s inaugural professorial lecture at the University of Westminster, 
London, UK. A copy can be accessed here: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/page-
1/Politicsandpassions.pdf. 
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political lives. This project is preceded by many years of dismantling the 
democratic theories of some of the most important representatives of rationally 
motivated politics, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, and their “followers”: Seyla 
Benhabib and Joshua Cohen.  
In an interview entitled “Democracy: Radical and Plural”, Mouffe is 
straightforward in claiming that her agonistic pluralistic model of democracy is set 
to argue against two other models of democracy: the aggregative and the 
deliberative model. The former model, according to her,  “views democracy 
mainly as an aggregation of interests: individuals have interests; they act in the 
field of politics in order to further these interests and democracy is a set of neutral 
procedures which allows these interests to be aggregated and a compromise 
among them to be reached”.27  In contradistinction, the theorists of the latter, 
says Mouffe, “have criticized this instrumental notion of politics, and rightly so: 
there is more to politics than the pursuit of self-interest. For deliberative 
democrats people act politically not only in order to realize their interests: they are 
also motivated by moral, normative considerations; by a search for the common 
good.” In the same interview, she is easy to admit that in both models, the main 
problem, “albeit in different ways, is their rationalism.” 28
The imminent questions this part of the thesis wishes to tackle are: (1) what 
motivates Mouffe’s criticisms against deliberative democratic theory? (2) Is the 
“rationalism” she talks about really pernicious to democratic politics? What is the 
role of reason-giving and rational decision-making in solving the problems and 
                                                 
27 Chantal Mouffe, Democracy: Radical and Plural. On CSD (Center for the 
Study of Democracy) Bulletin, Winter 2001-2002, Volume 9, No.1, p.11. 
28 Ibid, p.11.  
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resolving the conflicts our societies face? Is her suspicion against rationalism well 
argued enough that we can marginalize reason in our democratic discussions so as 
to prioritize what she calls “passions”? (3) What are these passions in the first 
place? Do they really contradict reason?  And does she provide a thorough 
account of them in her theory of agonistic democracy?  
 To arrive at a systematic answer to the questions above, we may return to 
her essay “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” Here, we can surmise 
that she has at least three major objections against deliberative democracy: 29 First, 
she holds that since deliberative democracy rests on a “rationalist” epistemology, 
it does not acknowledge the important role of passions and what she calls 
“collective forms of identifications in the field of politics.” (DD/AP, 11) Second, 
for her, it is the mistake of deliberative democrats to attempt reconciliation 
between the liberal and the democratic traditions; since, when one attempts to 
reconcile the two, one erases the conflictual nature of politics and instead, 
emphasize rational consensus. (3) The third complaint, which is less thematized in 
her early writings but has been constantly raised in more recent ones says that the 
erasure of conflict in politics by deliberative democrats is the result of their 
                                                 
29 In discussing Mouffe’s ideas, I will be relying mainly in her article 
Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? from the Political Science Series 72 
(Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 2000). This can be accessed at 
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf. The arguments in this article 
was also published in Social Research 66, no. 3 (1999): 745-758 in an essay with the 
same title. In this version of the article, she leaves Rawls and concentrates on 
Habermas’ version of deliberative democracy, which she perceives as the strongest 
and most sophisticated statement of the theory. The very same arguments also 
appear in her book The Democratic Paradox. From hereon, I shall use DD/AP to 
refer to citations from the online version of this article. 
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conflation of morality and politics or their examination of politics in the moral 
register.30
 In this thesis, I focus mainly in the first objection, which I shall call the 
“epistemic objection” against deliberative democratic theory, as most of the 
further objections usually generate from here. In her epistemic objection, Mouffe 
says that what renders deliberative democratic theory undesirable is its rational 
character and its consequent quest for a rational consensus, the perceived telos 
(end) of democratic deliberation.  
 If we consider Mouffe’s own epistemological bases and biases, we might 
have a glimpse as to where this staunch dismissal is coming from. As she often 
claims, Mouffe holds an anti-essentialist and anti-universalist theory of knowledge. 
In her articles and books, she often proclaims that she adheres to the insights of 
figures like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. Her agonistic 
pluralistic position can be seen as lying at the interstices of philosophical 
movements as diverse as ordinary language philosophy, post-structuralism and 
psychoanalysis.  
This range of influences largely affects the way she conceives the 
relationship between reason and politics, wherein deliberative democracy is a 
critical nexus. But then again, the curious reader might ask: how do such 
                                                 
30 Usually, these objections are followed by two propositions: (1) first, for 
Mouffe, democratic theory needs to “acknowledge the ineradicability of 
antagonism and the impossibility of achieving a fully inclusive rational consensus”. 
And (2) second, “a model of democracy in terms of ‘agonistic pluralism’ can help 
us to better envisage the main challenge facing democratic politics today: how to 
create democratic forms of identifications that will contribute to mobilize passions 
towards democratic designs” These propositions can be found in the abstract of 
“Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” 
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philosophical influences specifically affect and inform her view and criticism of 
deliberative democratic theory? 
 
 3.3. Two Theoretical Sources 
 I will not do a full exposition of all the figures and schools of thought I 
just mentioned above. However, I wish to point out that in her attacks against 
deliberative democracy, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Carl Schmitt appear to be 
Mouffe’s most prominent sources. She often distinguishes between her model and 
that of the deliberative democrats by invoking several philosophical theses of 
these two theoreticians. Briefly tracing the influences of these two thinkers in 
Mouffe’s epistemic objection may obliquely allow us to gain perspective on how 
her other objections, namely, the consensual and moral objections are set up. This 
theoretical clarification is crucial precisely because confronting Mouffe’s theory of 
agonistic pluralism can be a perplexing task for those who do not see the 
significant connections between Wittgenstein and democratic theory, or those 
who cannot even begin to read or sympathize with Schmitt because of his 
allegiance to National Socialism. 31  
                                                 
 31 As expected, Mouffe had to defend in her writings why she uses Carl 
Schmitt’s political thought despite the thinker’s allegiance to Nazism. In the The 
Return of the Political, we see one such defense: "Though Schmitt's criticisms were 
developed at the beginning of the century, they are, in fact, still pertinent and it 
would be superficial to believe that the writer's subsequent membership of the 
National Socialist Party means that we can simply ignore them. On the contrary, I 
believe it is by facing up to the challenge posed by such a rigorous and 
perspicacious opponent that we shall succeed in grasping the weak points in the 
dominant conception of modern democracy, in order that these may be 
remedied." See The Return of The Political (London ; New York: Verso, 1993) p. 118. 
In this book and in her following two books (The Democratic Paradox and On The 
Political), she allocates several chapters discussing Carl Schmitt’s contributions to 
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Let us begin with Wittgenstein.32 Mouffe’s re-appropriation of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy focuses on at least three points. First, she deploys 
Wittgenstein’s arguments to aid her “critique of rationalism.” She emphasizes, for 
example, Wittgenstein’s point that “in order to have agreements in opinions, there 
must first be agreements in forms of life.” (DD/AP, 11) This point relates to 
Wittgenstein’s argument in the following passage: 
So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false. It is what human beings say that is true and false; and 
they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in forms of life. 33
 
In conjunction with this, Mouffe also uses Wittgenstein’s insight regarding 
“rule following”. For Mouffe, Wittgenstein’s approach allows us to have 
numerous ways of following democratic rules. In contrast to the deliberative 
approach, “there cannot be one single best, more ‘rational’ way to obey those 
rules and this is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist 
democracy.”34She is worth quoting in full here so as to understand exactly why 
she thinks the Wittgensteinian approach can lead us to a better theory of 
democracy: 
                                                                                                                                            
political theory, especially his idea of “the political” which I shall briefly discuss 
here as well. Hereafter, I shall refer to citations from the Return of the Political as 
RTP. 
32 It is important to note that Mouffe frames her critique of rationalistic 
accounts of democracy such as the deliberative model using Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical vocabulary. I would like to delineate the fact that Wittgenstein 
himself did not intend to establish a theory of democratic politics. 
33 Mouffe quotes Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell), p. 88e.  
34 I lift this quote from Mouffe’s full-length discussion of her 
Wittgensteinian approach to democratic theory, which can be found in 
“Wittgenstein, Political Theory and Democracy.” Available from 
http://them.polylog.org/2/amc-en.htm.  
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Following a rule, says Wittgenstein, is analogous to obeying an 
order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular 
way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in 
another to the order and the training? Which one is right? This is 
indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. It cannot be 
resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct 
understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To 
be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between “obeying the 
rule” and “going against it”. But space needs to be provided for the 
many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules 
can be inscribed. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary 
accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization 
of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic 
society (Emphases mine). 35  
 
 Mouffe simply does not agree that a deliberation aiming for rational 
consensus can easily proceed in its rationalist form. Furthermore, she forwards 
this Wittgensteinian insight on rule following to criticize the “proceduralism” 
which, according to her, underpins theories of deliberative democracy such as 
Habermas’s. 36 Again, invoking Wittgenstein, she thinks that “to agree on the 
definition of a term is not enough and we need agreement in the way we use it.” 
(DD/AP, 11) And as Wittgenstein himself would say: “if language is to be a 
means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgments.”37 She says the following regarding this 
Wittgensteinian critique of Habermas’s proceduralism: 
                                                 
35 This is also from “Wittgenstein, Political Theory and Democracy.”  
36 This charge is typically cast in the following terms: that deliberative 
democratic theory eliminates “substantive” principles (such as freedom, basic 
needs, etc). However, this charge need not be accepted because most deliberative 
democratic theorists (following Habermas) do not necessarily maintain a stance of 
“pure proceduralism.” In fact, as we saw in Benhabib’s rendition of the model, 
there are already “substantive” claims (such as the importance of the principles of  
“universal moral respect” and  “egalitarian reciprocity”) that are parts of the 
theory. 
37 This is from the same page of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations I 
noted above. 
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For him (Wittgenstein), procedures only exist as a complex 
ensemble of practices. Those practices constitute specific forms of 
individuality, which make possible the allegiance to the procedures. 
It is because they are inscribed in shared forms of life and 
agreements in judgments that procedures can be accepted and 
followed. They cannot be seen as rules that are created on the basis 
of principles and then applied to specific cases. Rules for 
Wittgenstein are always abridgments of practices; they are 
inseparable from specific forms of life. This indicates that a strict 
separation between “procedural” and “substantial” or between 
“moral” and “ethical”, separations that are central to the 
Habermasian approach, cannot be maintained. Procedures always 
involve substantial ethical commitments and there can never be such 
thing as purely neutral procedures. (DD/AP, 12) 
 
 I understand what she says above as follows: that it is important to attend 
to the particular language game that will be utilized in a particular deliberation 
before we can settle on the rules of that deliberation; and since prior to our 
engagement in such a deliberation, there is already an agreement on the rules to be 
used, we cannot extricate substantial issues from procedural ones. Substance and 
procedure simply cannot be uncoupled from each other. 
 The remaining weight of Mouffe’s deployment of Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy pertains to her criticism of the idea of “rational consensus,” which she 
believes as the telos of democratic deliberation. Building upon the first point, 
where she claimed that certain forms of life simply could not arrive at a common 
ground (her incommensurability argument), she forwards her thesis against 
rational consensus by relying on Wittgenstein’s distinction between Meinungen and 
Lebensform.  For her, following Wittgenstein, “agreement is established not on 
significations (Meinungen) but on forms of life (Lebensform). It is Einstimmung, fusion 
of voices, made possible by a common form of life, not Einverstand, product of 
reason – like in Habermas.” (DD/AP, 12) Following this distinction, she puts out 
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what could possibly be the most brilliant flashpoint in her Wittgensteinian critique 
of the limits of consensus, where she quotes a famous line from Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty:  
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one 
another, then each man declares the other a fool and an heretic. I said I 
would combat the other man, but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; 
but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion.38
 
This means that for Mouffe, Wittgenstein suggests that the main obstacle 
for a rational consensus is not “merely empirical or epistemological.” Rather, it is 
“ontological.” As she says: 
Indeed, the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on 
matters of common concern is a conceptual impossibility since the 
particular forms of life, which are presented, as its “impediments” 
are its very condition of possibility. Without them no 
communication, no deliberation would ever take place. There is 
absolutely no justification for attributing a special privilege to a so-
called “moral point of view” governed by rationality and 
impartiality and where a rational universal consensus could be 
reached. (DD/AP, 13) 
 
Mouffe’s re-appropriation of Carl Schmitt’s ideas is pervasive in her 
writings and we now turn to some of the highlights of her discussion. It is 
probably fair to say that a large portion of her critique of deliberative democratic 
theory through the lens of the agonistic model relies heavily on Carl Schmitt’s key 
ideas. I do not see how she could have proceeded with her purportedly 
“alternative” model and established its analytical distinctions without her ample 
theoretical references to this particular thinker. Schmitt’s main influence on 
Mouffe is his idea of “the political” and its perennial neglect by the deliberative 
model of democracy. For Mouffe, deliberative democratic theory serves as a good 
                                                 
38 She quotes Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1969), p. 81e 
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example of Schmitt’s complaint against liberal thought. For Schmitt, “in a very 
systematic fashion liberal thought evades or ignores state and politics and moves 
instead in a typical always recurring polarity of two heterogeneous spheres, namely 
ethics and economics.” (DD/AP, 13)  
What does Mouffe mean by deliberative democratic theory’s neglect, or as 
she puts it, “blindness” to the political? What is “the political” in the first place? 
In another context, talking about liberalism, which she sees as a fundamental tenet 
of deliberative democratic theory (the other one, popular sovereignty), we will 
find her words informative: 
Liberal thought is necessarily blind to the political: liberalism’s 
individualism means it cannot understand the formation of collective 
identities. Yet the political is from the outset concerned with collective 
forms of identification; the political always has to do with the formation 
of an ‘Us’ as opposed to a ‘Them’, with conflict and antagonism; its 
differentia specifica, as Schmitt puts it, is the friend–enemy distinction. 
Rationalism, however, entails the negation of the ineradicability of 
antagonism. It is no wonder then, that liberal rationalism cannot 
grasp the nature of the political. Liberalism has to negate 
antagonism since antagonism, by highlighting the inescapable 
moment of decision – in the strong sense of having to make a 
decision on an undecidable terrain –reveals the limits of any rational 
consensus (emphases mine).39  
 
Her reiteration of Schmitt’s “friend-enemy distinction” brings to the fore 
the alleged denial of antagonism of deliberative democratic theory. She finds this 
as simply banishing “the political” which she concurrently situates in the 
antagonistic dimension of democratic politics. She further distinguishes the idea 
of “the political” from politics. For her, the latter “refers to the set of practices 
and institutions the aim of which is to create order, to organize human 
                                                 
39 From “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” p.5 Available 
from http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/moc01/moc01.pdf.   
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coexistence in conditions which are always conflictual because they are traversed 
by ‘the political.’” (RTP, 113) 
 It is via this distinction that she introduces to us her idea of “agonistic 
democracy.” 40 As she takes the political an ontologically given dimension of our 
democratic societies, her intent is to transform this antagonism to a form of 
relationship which does not deny it but makes a fruitful result out of it: agonism. 
She proposes to shift the friend-enemy distinction stated by Schmitt in his 
political theory into a relationship among “adversaries”: the political agents may 
have varying points of departure and arrival in a particular issue, but they still 
communicate with each other, without necessarily looking forward to a rational 
consensus. In other words, this is a situation where participants simply agree to 
disagree. Mouffe calls this “conflictual consensus” where emphasis is centered in 
the act of struggle among the political agents trying to come to terms with the 
issue at hand. 41
                                                 
40 As I noted earlier, Mouffe is not alone in supporting the idea of agonistic 
democracy. The concept of agonism can be retrieved from the tradition of Greek 
drama and political thought. According to Emma R. Norman, “the concept of 
agonism is commonly identified with democracy in its purest form and 
emphasizes popular contestation and debate as the principal aspects of political 
activity.” She parlays that the term is “derived from the scene of the agon in 
Ancient Greek drama, where the primary protagonists of the play appear, centre 
stage, to confront each other in verbal contest.” This etymological definition is 
helpful in so far as elucidating the idea that agonistic democracy really shifts the 
emphasis from co-operation and integration to “the activity of popular 
confrontation, conflict and debate on public matters and the arena(s) in which 
such contestation takes place.” See Norman’s entry on agonism in the Encyclopedia of 
Democratic Thought, Paul Barry Clark, Joe Foweraker (eds.), (New York: Routledge, 
2001), 5-10. 
41 The anonymous content reader of this thesis highlighted an issue that is 
worth pondering, and I hope to pursue in my further readings of Carl Schmitt. He 
claimed that Mouffe is inconsistent in using Schmitt’s political philosophy to 
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 For her, denying antagonisms is detrimental to democratic practice for if 
we do not take notice of them, they will arise through unfavorable ways. I think 
this is where Mouffe’s point is very difficult to dismiss. She hits the mark here 
especially if we think about the many long lasting deep divisions and perennial 
conflicts deeply entrenched in our democratic societies: from staunch versions of 
fanatical nationalism, the right-wing populist movements, and of course, religious 
fundamentalists dismissive of other faiths. For Mouffe, denying the existence of 
antagonisms as “manifested” through such movements is dangerous and will pose 
more threats to our democratic societies.  
Again, while I think Mouffe is correct here, I seriously doubt whether 
deliberative democrats are categorically denying such phenomena. It is just that 
the values that deliberative democratic theorists promote are perceptibly skewed 
elsewhere: some of them hope to transcend such antagonisms and if possible, 
build understanding amongst different persuasions and movements. Until she has 
provided us with some clear evidence aside from her negative interpretation of 
deliberative democracy, I am not willing to believe that deliberative democratic 
theorists are in denial that such antagonisms exist. 
 Another idea of Mouffe inspired by Schmitt, corollary to the discussion 
above, is regarding the status of the passions in deliberative democratic thought. 
This argument arises from the denial of the political that she charges deliberative 
democratic theorists have done. When we picture the scenario now as she paints 
it, it becomes apparent that deliberative democratic theorists, for Mouffe, are 
                                                                                                                                            
reject deliberative democracy precisely because “what Schmitt rejects, specifically, 
is the undermining of rational discussion in a liberal democracy.”  
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involved in some kind of a vicious cycle: because they emphasize reason and 
rational consensus, they in turn neglect the passions and relegate them to the 
private spheres of human activities. This is due to their blindness to the specificity 
of the political and their painful denial of the antagonistic dimensions of 
democracy.  
 What is seemingly implied in this vicious cycle is a charge of naïveté in the 
part of deliberative democratic theorists: they just do not know enough how the 
real political world functions and they assume that deep-seated differences can be 
solved by simply talking and agreeing, albeit the problem really boils down to the 
fact that the ways of life of various political agents conflict and are simply 
irreconcilable. This charge of naïveté is deeply tied with her charge that this type 
of democratic thinking is impotent: it is incapable of allowing integration and 
formation of individual and collective identities because these political phenomena 
occur through the mobilization of the passions and not the use of reason.  
Mouffe negatively depicts deliberative democratic theory and uses 
Schmitt’s idea of the political to do this. However, I find her analysis insufficient. 
Why? Because while she raises the importance of passions in democratic theory 
and practice, she fails to tell us how these passions specifically work, and what 
constitutes them in the first place. She does not properly explore, for example, 
how would a democratic theory, relinquished of reason-giving and full of passion 
will and ought to look like. She fails to suggest whether by injecting passions in 
democratic talk, she meant we abide by a form of argumentation guided by the 
principles of passionate persuasion such as rhetoric, or simply direct our energies 
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into straightforward political participation in the form of radical activism, via 
politically motivated rallies or demonstrations for example. 
Since I have not seen any philosophical attempt in Mouffe’s oeuvre to give 
any clarification whatsoever on what she concretely means by the passions, I 
consulted another contemporary thinker who could clarify this notion better. I 
find a somewhat comprehensive discussion of this notion in Philip Fisher’s The 
Vehement Passions. First, Fisher informs us that etymologically speaking, passion 
derives from the Greek pathema and the Latin pati, meaning, “to suffer.” He 
reminds us how the term came down to our philosophical, literary and cultural 
traditions in various forms and uses, but often carries negative connotations such 
as its permutation in the medical term “pathology”. However, he shows in his 
book, that a deeper excavation of the term can also provide us startling insights 
regarding what specifically constitutes the passions.  
His archeology of the passions points us to return, for example, to 
Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, where many of the foremost themes on the discussion of 
passion arise. Fisher also engages us with a discussion of John Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice, which he interestingly notes as one of the main instigators of a 
“dispassionate and impersonal theory of societal justice.” In his reading of Rawls, 
he notices that there was only one occasion in A Theory of Justice where Rawls 
confronts the passions: in his discussion of shame.  This, for Fisher, is 
symptomatic of how modern political thought had distinguished itself on 
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identifying the role of passions in a society: it relegated it to a category always 
below rational decision-making. 42
Aside from Fisher’s points above, it is also important to note that by using 
the term passion, Mouffe is invoking philosophical and literary horizons not 
conjured by another deeply related term, emotion. 43 The term “passion”, as 
standard lexicons tell us has at least five main meanings: First, it is a strong and 
barely uncontrollable emotion. Second, it is a state or outburst of such emotion. 
Third, it is an intense desire or enthusiasm for something or it could be the thing 
itself that arouses this enthusiasm. Fourth, and one of the most common uses of 
passion is that it is a form of strong sexual love. Finally, among Christians, passion 
has a very deep connection with the central narrative of their faith: the Passion of 
Jesus Christ as written in the Gospels, His self-emptying, suffering and crucifixion 
that allows for their salvation.44  
Passion, then, suggests thoroughness, harshness and a commitment to a 
cause or a goal through stubborn and persistent action. Also, in almost all the four 
definitions, passion connotes heat and tension between the passionate person and 
                                                 
42 See Philip Fisher’s The Vehement Passions (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003). 
 
43 To be sure, in moral philosophy, as brilliantly exhibited by Martha 
Nussbaum’s book Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) it seems more appropriate to evoke the term 
emotion. I suspect that since the concerns of Mouffe are mainly political thought 
and the realm of politics (and as she often abjures moral thinking), she has used 
the term passion to maintain the political texture of her arguments. However, we 
fail to see any elaboration as to why she uses this term over emotion.  
44 Such definitions of the term passion can be found in standard 
dictionaries. See, for example, the entry on “passion” in the New Oxford American 
Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), which I consulted for the 
definitions enumerated above. 
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the object of her passion. It is precisely this heat and tension that the milder term 
“emotion” does not capture well. As such, passions are also often seen in contrast 
with reason because of its embodied character. Unlike the purported universality 
of reason, passions are always seen as instantiated in particular forms. This is why 
in a recent book, Martha Nussbaum in her introduction to the book Upheavals of 
Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions returns to Marcel Proust and calls strong 
emotions’ manifestations as “upheavals”: they appear like sudden displacements in 
the geography of our rationality.45  
This geographic character of the passions—its location at the very heart of 
an individual’s bound time and space is what makes it different from reason. One 
prejudice against reason, or philosophical thought in general, is that it is, 
metaphorically speaking, happening in a desolated place. It is as if the philosopher 
stands in the middle of a desert where he can piece together his arguments outside 
the city’s walls. In contradistinction, an impassioned philosopher who 
acknowledges the tension between passion and reason remains in the city. For the 
city provides him with the material space: both public and political to engage with 
others in building a common world.  
                                                 
 45 In Nussbaum’s book I noted above, she opens her discussion of the 
intelligence of the emotions by invoking the following quote from Marcel Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past, which carries  a sublime way of thinking about the 
passions: “It is almost impossible to understand the extent to which this upheaval agitated, and 
by that very fact had temporarily enriched, the mind of M. de Charlus. Love in this way produces 
real geological upheavals of thought. In the mind of M. de Charlus, which only several days before 
resembled a plane so flat that even from a good vantage point one could not have discerned an 
idea sticking up above the ground, a mountain range had abruptly thrust itself into view, hard as 
rock--but mountains sculpted as if an artist, instead of taking the marble away, had worked it 
on the spot, and where the twisted about one another, in giant and swollen groupings, Rage, 
Jealousy, Curiosity, Envy, Hate, Suffering, Pride, Astonishment, and Love.” 
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We can surmise then that Mouffe’s criticism, while seemingly very 
powerful, contains a gap that demands further explanation and exploration, 
which, if she offers thoughtfully can help her model of agonistic democracy fulfill 
its promises. Without an elucidation as to what constitutes the passions, and how 
it exactly becomes the stuff of integration and collective identity formation, 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism remains a useful and important critique but not a full 
“alternative” to the deliberative democratic model as she deems it to be.  
In the discussion above, we saw that Mouffe dismisses deliberative 
democracy due to the epistemic principles that define it. For her, it is both an 
undesirable and unfeasible way of envisaging democracy. Now, we wonder: to 
what extent was Mouffe sound in her critique of deliberative democracy? Or to 
put it more crudely but starkly: does she really provide a substantial argument that 
could compel us to leave deliberative democratic theory entirely for her agonistic 
model? Or is she barking up the wrong tree by positing these criticisms precisely 
because deliberative democratic theory, both as a set of principles and as a 
decision-making procedure is an ineluctably agonistic process, for it inevitably 
involves contestation as part of its main procedure and it also often carries out a 
debate regarding the concepts that preclude such discussion? These are just some 
of the questions that we can pose regarding the tenability of Mouffe’s arguments.  
 To shed light on these questions, in the next chapter, I wish to look for 
resources within and among deliberative democratic theorists that could possibly 
respond to Mouffe’s epistemic objection. I seek this response from the same 
deliberative theorist I discussed in the previous chapter, Seyla Benhabib. I would 
like to gather some of her insights and deploy them against Mouffe’s objection in 
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order to arrive at a fairer conception of deliberative democratic theory. I do not 
claim that this response is definitive and will close the debate between deliberative 
democratic theorists and its agonistic critics; but this is one way of measuring to 
what extent deliberative democratic theorists could in fact accommodate this type 
of agonistic epistemic objection without necessarily collapsing the general stance 






















A REJOINDER TO THE AGONISTIC CRITIQUE 
 
 
4.1.Reading Benhabib Against Benhabib 
 In her various writings, Seyla Benhabib never fails to remind us of the 
value of universalism and the excesses of post-Enlightenment rationalism in 
political thought. Since the time of Kant, universalism and rationalism are often 
seen as theoretical allies. Benhabib, in a sophisticated philosophical fashion, offers 
a divorce of the two. However, her modus operandi deviates from some of the 
post-structuralist critiques offered by such political thinkers as Chantal Mouffe. I 
find in these types of criticism an attempt to dismantle both, leaving our politico-
theoretical horizons debilitated and often times unnecessarily pessimistic. On the 
contrary, the divorce Benhabib sets is a friendly one; it is an attempt to look for 
those loose threads of thought that unmask the hidden contradictions and 
potentially useful insights between these two Enlightenment ideals without 
rejecting them altogether.  
 At the heart of this section is an attempt to understand Benhabib’s 
preoccupation with the tensions between reason and passion. Here, I try to 
articulate a new vein from my engagement with Benhabib’s writings: is it possible 
to conceive of political passions in light of the tensions she problematizes in her 
politico-philosophical writings? I suggest that it is possible yet it is not without its 
theoretical obstacles.  
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Contra Mouffe, I shall rehearse in detail how I plan to proceed with this 
“Benhabibian” deliberative response. In 4.2, I go through several points of 
Benhabib’s departure from Habermas’s discourse ethics. Here, I highlight her 
notion of “interactive universalism,” especially the idea of the “generalized and 
the concrete other,” one of the strongest feminist critiques of post-Enlightenment 
rationality and surely one of Benhabib’s significant contributions to the 
burgeoning literature on deliberative democratic theory. This part also unweaves 
the Arendtian threads in Benhabib’s deliberative democratic thought. In other 
words, I will show how the political thought of Hannah Arendt aided Benhabib in 
reshaping the general framework of Habermas’s discourse ethical theory and its 
resultant theory of deliberative democracy.  
Here, I begin to emphasize Benhabib’s ambivalent stance regarding the 
form that democratic deliberation should take. On the one hand, I suggest that 
through Benhabib’s engagement with Arendt, she was able to produce a vision of 
democratic deliberation that does not put so much emphasis on rational 
consensus, but one that is willing to renegotiate itself and welcome the possibility 
of dissent and the surprise of the other. This goes against the Habermasian and 
the Rawlsian currents of democratic deliberation that leads Mouffe to categorically 
reject deliberative democratic theory. In Benhabib’s critical reconstruction of 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, we see a possibility of transcending the 
reason/passion opposition via her acknowledgement of the role of narrative and 
historical concreteness in moral-political thinking.  
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On the other hand, Benhabib’s political thought surprisingly contains a 
dismissive attitude towards a form of communication related to passionate 
persuasion: rhetoric. I explore this in 4.3, where I will show that while it is 
interesting that she takes Arendt’s advise on emphasizing the plurality of speech 
forms in a deliberative democracy, at the same time, she categorically dismisses 
rhetoric as one form of such speech. I argue that this might make her deliberative 
democratic account appear incoherent with her general political thought as she 
shares the tendency with Habermas to regard rhetoric as opposed to a more 
dialectical-philosophical view of democratic deliberation. 46
Somewhat like reading (and thinking with) Benhabib against Benhabib, I 
elucidate this point through reconstructing a disagreement between her and 
another contemporary political theorist, who unlike many prominent democratic 
theorists writing from a deliberative point of view, takes rhetoric seriously: Iris 
Marion Young. This debate, located at the margins (footnotes) of both theorists’ 
writings, is crucial for the question of the thesis as it throws light on how the 
dominance of a particular form of communication, dialectic (philosophy), or what 
Young simply calls “argument” may possibly hinder some participants of 
democratic discussions instead of answering the problem of inclusion and 
difference in pluralistic democratic societies. 
 
                                                 
46 The beginnings and initial reception of this tendency can be traced back in 
the history of Western political thought. It will be the task of the fifth and last 
chapter to properly explore this as I turn to a reading of Aristotle’s On Rhetoric and 
re-turn to a more ancient view of the relationship between reason and persuasion. 
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4.2.  Benhabib against Habermas’s Universalizability Principle 
At this juncture, the reader might ask: why not engage with Habermas’s 
deliberative democratic theory alone instead, as it is the source of Benhabib’s 
model and one of the main targets of Mouffe’s complaints in the first place? My 
answer to this question is simple. In her essay “Deliberative Democracy or 
Agonistic Pluralism?” it is worth noting that while Mouffe engages with 
Habermas’s texts, a huge chunk of her rendition of the theory derives from 
Benhabib’s essay “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” And 
it is easy to notice in the said essay that her discussion of deliberative democratic 
theory shifts to and fro between Habermas and Benhabib, sometimes without 
qualifying their differences. It is precisely because this to-ing and fro-ing can be 
philosophically misleading that I wish to take note of the disagreements between 
Habermas and Benhabib in this part of the chapter. 
From this section on, I shall develop a fuller theoretical response to 
Mouffe’s complaints against deliberative democratic theory not only from 
Benhabib’s most recent work but also from the larger body of her writings. 
Benhabib’s earlier writings such as Situating the Self contain themes that re-echo the 
tension between reason and passion albeit through her account of “interactive 
universalism.” By returning to the earlier Benhabib, we come closer to the genesis 
and nerve center of her thought from which her current positions generate. 
Situating the Self, arguably her most feminist work, is also where we see Benhabib’s 
distinct and emerging role as a political theorist: a mediatrix, a woman-thinker 
who mediates. The most brilliant characteristic of Benhabib as a feminist political 
thinker is her capacity to synthesize seemingly contradictory bodies of political 
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thought such as liberalism, communitarianism, postmodernism, feminism and 
critical theory creatively.  
Assuming the role of a mediatrix is not easy. It demands thoughtfulness 
and generosity to listen to and make sense of seemingly incommensurable and 
irreconcilable threads and trends of thought. Mediation is also Benhabib’s way to 
avoid what she sees as the “dizzying and dazzling play of surfaces” fashionable in 
contemporary philosophical circles today.47 Benhabib skillfully plays this role 
through grappling with the tension between the universal and particular, the 
generalized and concrete other, which can consequently shed light on the 
relationship between reason and passion as well. She problematizes these binary 
oppositions critically and shows us that there are spaces in-between where creative 
tensions between these seeming opposites lie. 48
Somewhat anticipating Chantal Mouffe’s remarks against the rationalist 
and consensual baggage of deliberative democracy, Benhabib clarified in her 
article “In Defense of Universalism. Yet Again! A Response to the Critics of 
Situating the Self”, that she does not accept Habermas’s “strict consensual model 
of discourse ethics.” Her argument goes this way: 
                                                 
47 See for example, her “Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to 
Jean Francois Lyotard”, New German Critique No. 22 (1984), 103-26. 
48 I shall proceed with two points that would make Benhabib’s role as 
mediatrix clearer: (a) First, I will show that while she maintains Habermasian 
discourse ethics as a “metanorm”, she rejects his universalizability or “U” 
Principle. Benhabib reads Habermas charitably but also scrutinizes his 
weaknesses, including his excessive re-appropriation of Kantian epistemology. (b) 
This jettisoning of the “U” principle paves the way for a conception of moral and 
political judgment that is rather different from Habermas’s reason and consensus-
driven account that Mouffe criticizes. I suggest that this is partly because of 
Benhabib’s turning to Hannah Arendt’s notion of “enlarged mentality”, a re-
reading of Kant’s notion of “reflective judgment.”  
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The nerve of my reformulation of the universalist tradition is the 
reconstruction of the “moral point of view” along the model of a moral 
conversation, subject to the principles of universal moral respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity. The goal of such moral conversation is not consensus or 
unanimity, but, in Hannah Arendt’s terms, “the anticipated communication 
with others with whom I know I must finally come to some agreement.” 
Departing from the strict consensual model of Habermas’s discourse ethics, I 
sought to stake a middle ground between aprioristic universalism and other 
more radical forms of contextualism (emphases mine, 34-8).49  
 
Benhabib’s reformulation of discourse ethics is the result of rethinking 
moral and political universalism in light of contemporary discontent with such 
ideals. Her reformulation involved two steps: first, building on Karl Otto-Apel 
and Jürgen Habermas, she “rearticulates” a “discursive, communicative concept 
of rationality” (YA, 174). Then, she recognized, by invoking feminist and 
communitarian critiques of reason, that “the subjects of reason are finite, 
embodied, and fragile creatures, not disembodied cogitos or abstract unities of 
transcendental appreciation”. (YA, 174) Her innovation in this reformulation is 
that as far as Habermas’s discourse ethics is concerned, she does not follow his 
Kantian “principle of universalizability” but in fact rejects it.  
From where I see it, there are at least two main issues at stake in this 
rejection: the universalizability principle itself and the issue of rational consensus 
as the perceived telos of democratic deliberation.  
Benhabib’s case against the “U” principle in discourse ethics has a rich 
historical and theoretical precedent. It goes all the way back to Hegel’s critique of 
the Kantian formula “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same 
                                                 
49 Seyla Benhabib, “In Defense of Universalism. Yet Again! A Response to 
Critics of Situating the Self,” New German Critique 62 (Spring-Summer, 1997): 175. 
From hereon, I shall refer to references to this article as YA. 
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time will that it should become a universal law” where Hegel complains that the 
Kantian formula is “inconsistent at best” and “empty at worst.” 50 But how 
exactly does she proceed with this rejection of the “U” principle? What is 
Habermas’s “U” principle anyway and what is its role in discourse ethics and 
deliberative democracy in the first place? To answer the second question first, 
Habermas’s “U” principle is formulated thus: 
Unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side 
effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be 
expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each 
individual, a norm of action could not be considered valid (emphases 
mine).51  
 
To clarify Benhabib’s reasons for rejecting the “U” principle, we can return 
to her argument in “Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in 
Practical Philosophy”, where she gives a strong clarification that illuminates her 
break from Habermas: 
The chief difference between my proposal and Habermas’s is that for 
him “U” has the effect of guaranteeing consensus. Without having their 
interests violated, all could freely consent to some moral content. But 
the difficulty with consent theories is as old as Rousseau’s dictum—
“On les forcera d’etre libre.” Consent alone cannot be a criterion of anything, 
neither of truth nor of moral validity; rather it is always the rationality of a 
procedure for attaining agreement, which is of philosophical interest. We must 
interpret consent not as an end-goal but as a process for the cooperative 
generation of truth or validity. The core intuition behind modern 
universalizability procedures is not that everybody could or would 
                                                 
 
50 Seyla Benhabib, “Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in 
Practical Philosophy” in The Communicative Ethics Controversy, ed. Seyla Benhabib 
and Fred Dallmayr, (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1990), 334. From 
hereon, I shall refer to this article as CE. 
51 Jürgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of 
Philosophical Justification,” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 
(Cambridge: MIT, 1990) 43-116, here 86. 
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agree to the same set of principles, but that these principles have 
been adopted as a result of procedure, whether of moral reasoning or 
of public debate, which we are ready to deem “reasonable and fair.” 
It is not the result of the process of moral judgment alone that 
counts but the process for the attainment of such judgment, which 
plays a role in its validity, and I would say, moral worth. Consent is a 
misleading term for capturing the idea behind communicative ethics: namely, the 
processual generation of reasonable agreement about moral 
principles via an open-ended moral conversation (emphases mine). 
(CE, 345)  
 
 
This passage clarifies the deep chasm between Habermas and Benhabib. 
There is a rift between their philosophical opinions, which Mouffe does not 
properly acknowledge and qualify in her jeremiads against their theory of 
deliberative democracy. The bottom line of this criticism is Benhabib’s reservation 
on the idea of consensus as the bedrock of epistemological and moral certainty.  
In a way, she sees the same danger as Mouffe sees in Habermas and in a sense she 
is closer to Mouffe than to Habermas on this issue. However, as it should be clear 
by now, Mouffe confused the ways through which deliberative democratic 
theorists prioritize and theorize the idea of consensus.  
 
For Benhabib, the danger of consensus begins to appear when it has 
become the ultimate criterion for establishing validity and legitimacy.  For one, 
consensus alone cannot guarantee the recognition of otherness. It can also 
obscure and possibly deny differences: two considerations, which Benhabib 
deems to be important in democratic deliberation.  Thus, she veers away from the 
illusion of a rational consensus and emphasizes “contingent processes of rationally 
justifiable agreement’” (Verstandigung) (YA, 187). She places the stress in the 
process of deliberation and not in its end-goal.  Again, this places her closer to 
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Mouffe’s emphasis on the importance of “undecidability” in a democratic 
deliberation. Like Mouffe, Benhabib endorses an open-ended conversation hinged 
on opening the pathways of deliberation, so to speak, to unexpected places. 
Finally, when she says that consent is a “misleading term to characterize the 
project of communicative ethics,” she consequently brings to the fore the value of 
deliberative democracy as a discernment process (choosing, thinking through, 
“soul-searching”), which makes it worth pursuing if only to listen to the multitude 
and plurality of voices involved in such a process.  
Benhabib’s departure from Habermas is not only in his universalizability 
principle based on rational consensus. She also expressed her discontent on the 
seeming split between moral ideals and moral emotions present in discourse 
ethics. This somehow foreshadows Mouffe’s complaint that most deliberative 
democrats assume communication to be completely uncontaminated by passions, 
albeit Benhabib talks about the issue in the context of moral deliberation.  
Benhabib’s discontent goes all the way back to her first book, Critique, Norm 
and Utopia and an early article “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative 
Ethics” where she highlights that this split can be traced all the way back to 
Hobbes and is reiterated by Habermas. She remarks that, “the institutional 
distinction between the public and the private, between the public sphere of 
justice, the civic sphere of friendship, and the private sphere of intimacy, has also 
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resulted in the incompatibility of an ethical vision of principles and an ethical 
vision of care and solidarity.”52  
Benhabib’s critique also stretches to Kant and his “repressive attitude 
towards inner nature.”  For Benhabib, Kant had excluded “our needs and 
affective nature” from the “realm of moral theory.” This resulted in the 
dichotomization of moral reasoning and our moral emotions, which further led to 
the silencing of the latter. (UD, 94) To answer for this split, she formulated a 
model that could mediate both: the “generalized” and “concrete” other, which 
underpins her idea of “interactive universalism.” This formulation, closely 
following Carol Gilligan’s criticism of Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral 
development, acknowledges the complex interaction between universal rational 
claims and particular “needs, desires and affects”.  As a counterpoint to and 
reformulation of Habermasian (and Kantian) rationality, she develops the 
“standpoint of the concrete other”, which: 
…requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual 
with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution. In 
assuming this standpoint, we abstract from what constitutes our 
commonality and seek to understand the distinctiveness of the other. We 
seek to comprehend the needs of the other, their motivations, what 
they search for, and what they desire. Our relations to the other is 
governed by the norm of complementary reciprocity: each is entitled 
to expect and to assume from the other forms of behavior through 
which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete, 
individual being with specific needs, talents and capacities. Our difference in 
this case complements, rather than excludes one another (emphases mine). 
(UD, 93)  
 
                                                 
52 Seyla Benhabib, “The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics” 
New German Critique 35, Special Issue on Jürgen Habermas (Spring-Summer, 
1985), 94. From hereon, I shall refer to this article as UD. 
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 In this passage, we see how Benhabib mediates the relationship between 
the generality and the concreteness of being an-other for an-other. She reminds us 
that our general characteristics as human beings, which are often understood in 
terms of our universal capacity for speech, action and reason do not necessarily 
contradict with our characteristics as concrete persons. Her claim is paradoxical: 
as we recognize our identity as a generalized other, in turn, we realize the various 
permutations that make us concretely different from each other. As humans, we 
are all speaking, acting and thinking beings, but we also speak, act and think in an 
infinitely plural number of ways. This bespeaks of what presupposes the human 
condition and what also makes Benhabib’s account of deliberative democracy 
deliberately possess an Arendtian moment: her acknowledgement of human 
plurality.  
 In the same passage I quoted from “In Defense of Universalism. Yet 
Again! A Response to the Critics of Situating the Self,” we already sense a hint 
that in her dissent from Habermas, Benhabib is advocating a position inspired by 
and closer to Hannah Arendt. This is the second of the twin issues I would like to 
unpack at this point. She explicitly follows Arendt by stating that her model does 
not prioritize “consensus or unanimity” but an “anticipated communication” that 
may or may not lead into an agreement with others. This form of moral and 
political judgment without consensus is what Benhabib, following Arendt’s 
reflections on Kant’s Critique of Judgment, calls “enlarged mentality” or 
“representative thinking.”  
 To illuminate further, we can return to Arendt’s own reflections in her 
essay “The Crisis of Culture” from her book Between Past and Future. Arendt says: 
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 The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, and 
the thinking process which is active in judging something is not, like 
the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, 
but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in 
making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with 
whom I know I must finally come to some agreement. From this 
potential agreement judgment derives its specific validity. This 
means, on the one hand, that such judgment must liberate itself 
from the “subjective private conditions,” that is from the 
idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of each 
individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are only 
privately held opinions but which are not fit to enter the market 
place, and lack all validity in the public realm. And this enlarged way of 
thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend its individual limitations, 
cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others “in 
whose place” it must think, whose perspective it must take into consideration and 
without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all (emphases 
mine).53  
  
In this passage, we can read “enlarged mentality” as a crucial quality of the 
political agent’s mind that subsequently allows her to judge issues as they appear 
in the public sphere. This idea of “enlarged mentality” calls for the political agent 
to be sensitive with other participants’ opinions. It is through her own “internal 
deliberation” with such opinions that her own opinion about public issues 
becomes more impartial. As such, an enlarged mentality largely remains at the 
cognitive level. As Arendt usually qualifies, she does not aim to use this idea to 
call for empathy nor to arrive at a consensual agreement with one another. 
Benhabib usually follows her on this train of thought as well. 
 On the issue of consensus, Benhabib can be seen as following Arendt in 
pointing out that instead of painfully agonizing on arriving at the same position on 
a given moral or political problem, consensus might be better seen as a heuristic 
principle, a motivation inspiring the deliberative process.  In other words, 
                                                 
53 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 
1993), 220. 
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consensus can be construed as deliberation’s utopian element; it is the moment 
that it strives to achieve. This moment possesses a paradoxical nature: for the very 
achievement of consensus destroys the deliberative process and signals a pause of 
silence in the conversation. This silence, however, is not necessarily desirable. It is 
desirable if through the process of communication, the deliberators were able to 
come to a solution that would permit them to act on the promises of their 
deliberation. However, it is suspect if it was achieved only because the deliberators 
agreed to compromise each other’s values through violent threats and coercion, 
and not through reason and persuasion. A “full agreement”, in a sense, negates 
the condition of plurality where all of the participants in the deliberation are 
thrown.  
Arendt’s reflections on political agency as disclosed through speech and 
action which in turn brings forth human plurality is one of her most compelling 
contributions to the history of political thought. 54 To put it briefly, for Arendt, 
action and speech reveal the “whoness” of the political agent. We are known by 
the world around us through what we do and what we say. And it is precisely 
because we have various ways of speaking and acting that every public space 
where persons gather generates plurality.  
What is so original in this seemingly very simple insight? If seen in the light 
of our previous reflections on deliberative democratic theory, I suggest that it can 
be a flashpoint to a theory of deliberation that does not limit itself to exclusive 
ways and forms of deliberation. This Arendtian insight is illuminating precisely 
                                                 
54 See Hannah Arendt’s fifth chapter on “Action” of The Human Condition. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
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because it allows us to construe other ways of talking and other ways of acting as 
part of our democratic exchanges of opinions. Furthermore, by understanding 
public political deliberation in terms of Arendt’s notion of plurality, we can 
surmise: (1) that their expression be not limited to one ideal type of argumentation 
alone and (2) that the spaces where they proliferate, precisely because they are 
“public”, should be allowed to multiply as well. 
Furthermore, Arendt is also acutely aware of the nature and importance of 
a particular form of speech that proliferates in public political spaces: rhetoric. In 
the most recent collection of her unpublished essays, The Promise of Politics, she 
offers a reflection on the radical tensions between philosophy and politics, where 
she considers Plato’s frustrations over Socrates’ trial a pivotal event. Here, Arendt 
highlights the difference between philosophical speech (dialectic) and persuasive 
speech (rhetoric). Let us listen: 
In the process of reasoning out the implications of Socrates’ trial, 
Plato arrived both at his concept of truth as the very opposite of 
opinion and at his notion of a specifically philosophical form of 
speech, dialegesthai, as the opposite of persuasion and rhetoric. 
Aristotle takes these distinctions and oppositions as a matter of 
course when he begins his Rhetoric, which belongs to his political 
writings no less than his Ethics, with the statement: he Rhetorike estin 
antistrophose te dialektike (the art of persuasion [and therefore the 
political art of speech] is the counterpart of the art of dialectic [the 
art of philosophical speech]). (Rhetoric 1354 a I) The chief distinction 
between persuasion and dialectic is that the former always addresses a 
multitude (peahen ta plethe) whereas dialectic is possible only as a dialogue 
between two. 55
 
Going further, Arendt thinks that Socrates was wrong in addressing “his 
judges in the form of dialectic” and for her, this is precisely the reason why “he 
                                                 




cannot persuade them.” Then, she follows by suggesting where persuasion 
actually comes from: it comes from opinions and nor from truth. Arendt says that 
Socrates’ mistake lies in the fact that he will never persuade the judges and “arrive 
at some truth” as he would with the citizens of Athens and his pupils via dialectic. 
In short, for Arendt, persuasive speech (rhetoric) deals with the exchange of 
opinions of the multitude while philosophical speech (dialectic) deals with arriving 
at the truth in a one-to-one dialogue.56
In so far as democratic deliberation is concerned then, Arendt may point 
us to at least two directions: first, by allowing the various opinions of other 
political agents to form an “internal deliberation” within ourselves so to speak, we 
are able to stretch our political imagination thus allowing us to become better 
spectators and judges of deliberation in the public forum. This points to the 
relevance of the cognitive or rational character of the deliberation process. 
Benhabib captures this very well in her account. However, and this is perhaps 
where I suggest to look at another direction in Arendt’s thinking, it is also 
important to emphasize that we do not only learn how to watch, listen, think and 
see (theorize) within and among ourselves in a democratic deliberation, but, we 
also ought to be sensitive on how we engage in various ways of speaking. And this 
is where, as we will see in next part and chapter, rhetoric may help us. Cicero’s 
lament over the separation of the tongue (lingua) and the brain (cor) in the 
philosophical tradition (as the epigraph I placed at the very beginning of this 
thesis succinctly expresses) re-echoes this point.  
                                                 
56 ibid, 13-14. 
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To recapitulate before we turn to the next section, we can give Mouffe’s 
epistemic objection a deliberative response: a more generous reading of the 
various trajectories and receptions of the Habermasian vein of deliberative 
democratic theory can help allay Mouffe’s epistemic complaint. Furthermore, we 
can accommodate the epistemic objection without dismantling the general project 
of deliberative democratic theory, precisely because in some versions of the theory 
such as Benhabib’s, there is already an acknowledgement of the negotiable status 
of rational consensus. In short, according to Benhabib’s reconstruction of 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, rational consensus need not be the goal and only aim 
of deliberation.  
However, as I already prefigured earlier, there is a somewhat surprising 
element in Benhabib’s theory of deliberative democracy that is often relegated in 
the margins of her discussion, which, if we bring to the fore can illuminate one of 
its limitations. With her adherence to Arendt’s emphasis on the importance of 
plurality in political thinking, we would expect that her theory of democratic 
deliberation would accommodate various forms of communication that deviates 
from logico-deductive argumentation that greatly informs Habermas’s theory of 
democratic deliberation. However, a published debate between her and another 
deliberative theorist, Iris Marion Young would clarify that this expectation is 
unfulfilled. In the next section, we turn to this critical dialogue between two 
theorists who adhere to and interpret Habermas’s discourse ethics and theory of 
democratic deliberation in divergent ways. We shall also begin to see how these 
contemporary democratic theorists construe the relationship between dialectic, the 
“art of philosophical speech” and rhetoric, the “art of political speech.” 
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4.3 Iris Marion Young’s Suggestion: Give Rhetoric a Chance 
Iris Marion Young shares some of the most fundamental tenets of 
deliberative democratic thought with theorists such as Seyla Benhabib. In fact, her 
model, which she prefers to call “communicative democracy”, explicitly builds 
upon the deliberative model of democracy, also following Habermas’s discourse 
ethics and theory of communicative action. However, she deviates from it in its 
strict adherence to the form of political communication it purportedly endorses: 
dialectic, or what she simply prefers to call “argument.”  
In a sense, Young’s deviation can be seen as somewhat resonating the 
complaint forwarded by Mouffe, which I already discussed earlier. What makes 
Young’s suggestions deserve a hearing at this point though is her thorough 
theorization of what constitutes possible “enhancements” of the dominant form 
of political communication in deliberative democratic theory. Unlike Mouffe, 
Young does not see rational argumentation as necessarily dangerous to democratic 
politics. She just thinks that argumentation can be further enhanced by other ways 
of communication.  
Before getting into a deeper discussion of her suggested enhancements, 
first, I wish to reiterate a helpful preliminary distinction Young introduced in her 
book Inclusion and Democracy which will be useful in eventually seeing why she 
defends rhetoric as a legitimate enhancement to a theory of democratic 
deliberation. Young differentiates between “external exclusion” and “internal 
exclusion.” For her, external exclusion is a more deliberate form of exclusion, for 
example, when an individual or a group of people is dismissed as a member of a 
deliberative forum. She gives “backdoor brokering” as an example of this, or 
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simply, the formation of expert-discussion groups set up prior to public 
consultation, and whose opinions are usually introduced as established facts that 
the public ought to believe and support as public policies.   
On the other hand, internal exclusion occurs when the individual or the 
group are invited to join the democratic discourse, but their manner of 
communication are not easily accepted as the expected and standard form of 
communication. In effect, despite one’s presence in a particular forum, she is not 
able to influence the way of thinking of other participants.57 (I&D, 55) Several of 
these internal form of exclusion include: “the terms of discourse make 
assumptions some do not share, the interaction privileges specific styles of 
expression, the participation of some people is dismissed as out of order.” (I&D, 
53) This is where the very subtle exclusion of other forms of communication, 
such as rhetoric, begins to occur. 
In a chapter called “Inclusive Political Communication,” she describes 
three enhancements to democratic deliberation and named them “greeting, 
rhetoric and narrative.” Here, I will focus my discussion on the second, rhetoric, 
for among the three, this is where stark disagreements among most theorists and 
critics of deliberative democracy often occur. The significant questions at this 
point are: according to Young, what is rhetoric? What makes it an attractive 






57 Here, I shall refer to citations from Iris Marion Young’s book Inclusion 
and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) as I&D.  
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“enhancer” for democratic deliberation? What would be the benefits, so to speak, 
of allowing rhetoric enter the public forum? How should we see rhetoric’s 
relationship to critical argumentation? 58- 
First of all, Young acknowledges that a number of deliberative democratic 
theorists allow for a “Platonic distinction between rational speech and mere 
rhetoric.” For her, this results to a denigration of “emotion, figurative language, or 
unusual or playful forms of expression.” This distinction works by looking at 
“rational speech” as:  
universalistic, dispassionate, culturally and stylistically neutral 
argument that focus the mind on their evidence and logical 
connections, rather than move the heart or engage the imagination. 
(I&D, 63) 
 
  According to Young, this type of distinction occurs, for example, in 
Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics, where he distinguishes “rational speech 
from rhetoric” with the former corresponding to a “communicative function” and 
the latter to a “strategic function.” According to this correspondence, 
“communicative action” and “rhetorical speech” are defined as:  
Communicative action involves speech that makes assertions about 
the natural or human world and signals in its illocutionary acts its 
commitment to those claims and a willingness to defend them with 
reasons. Rhetorical speech, on the other hand, aims not to reach 
understanding with others, but only to manipulate their thought 
and feeling in directions that serve the speaker's own ends. (I&D, 
63) 
 
  For Young, this tendency within deliberative democratic theory to give 
priority to a particular type of communication that is supposedly less embodied 
                                                 
58 These questions run parallel to the set of questions I would eventually 
ask in my discussion of Aristotle’s On Rhetoric in the next chapter and these are 
just some of the questions that Young straightforwardly addresses in her 
discussion of rhetoric. 
  73
and dispassionate, while negatively depicting rhetoric, has exclusionary results. She 
thinks that without most people noticing it, in fact, every political expression 
(whether it is being uttered by a politician or an academic) has its rhetorical 
aspects; for every moment of communication is situated in a particular time and 
place and geared towards a particular audience. For her, instead of “bracketing” 
rhetoric for political communication to be “truly rational,” it is more important to 
look at it as an aspect of the communication process that we “ought to attend in 
our engagement with one another”. (I&D, 64) 
Young renders her own definition of rhetoric, a definition reechoing 
classical characterizations of rhetoric while containing a very contemporary twist. 
First of all, for Young, the concept of rhetoric “assumes a distinction between 
what a discourse says, its substantive content of message, and how it says it.” For 
her, “the general category of 'rhetoric'…refers to the various ways something can 
be said, which colour and condition its substantive content.” (I&D, 64). She 
enumerates the following as the most important aspects of this type of 
communication:  
(a) the emotional tone of the discourse, whether its content is 
uttered with fear, hope, anger, joy, and other expressions of passion 
that move through discourse. No discourse lacks emotional tone; 
'dispassionate' discourses carry an emotional tone of calm and 
distance. (b) The use in discourse of figures of speech, such as 
simile, metaphor, puns, synecdoche, etc., along with the styles or 
attitudes such figures produce---that is, to be playful, humurous, 
ironic, deadpan, mocking, grave or majestic. (c) Forms of making a 
point do not only involve speech, such as visual media, signs and 
banners, street demonstration, guerilla theatre and the use of 
symbols in all these contexts. (d) All these affective, embodied, and 
stylistic aspects of communication, finally, involve attention to the 
particular audience of one's communication, and orienting one's 
claims and arguments to the particular assumptions, history and 




 To put it simply, the meat of Young’s discussion of rhetoric as an enhancer 
of critical argumentation can be summarized into three main points. For Young, 
rhetoric has at least three positive “functions” in political communication.  
(a) Rhetorical moves often help to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation. 
(I&D, 66) 
(b) Rhetoric fashions claims and arguments in ways appropriate to a particular 
public in a particular situation. (I&D, 67) 
(c) Rhetoric motivates the move from reason to judgment. (I&D, 69) 
I see in Young’s suggestion above a theory of democratic deliberation that 
embraces rhetoric, as intimately connected with the idea of “particularity.” By 
particularity, I mean to say that in her suggestion, she clarifies to us that rhetoric 
has the capacity to deal with practical and concrete questions—which are often 
the points-of-departure of democratic deliberations. Why is this so? In this view, 
passionate pleas for abstract issues such as claims for “justice” become 
concretized through specific and historicized narratives. Particular reasons 
parlayed to a particular audience results in specific, well-contextualized practical 
judgments that may lead to decisive political action. Also, the strategies available 
within rhetoric allow the deliberative agent to explain her side of the issue to a 
larger audience, which is typically the case in sites of democratic deliberations 
anyway: whether it is in a congressional assembly or in a community meeting.  
Her suggestion also presupposes a point that Arendt already raised that I 
will also re-echo later: that dialectic, if we follow its Socratic form, does not allow 
too well of the advantages enumerated above simply because of its emphasis on 
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one-on-one dialogue rather than on deliberation-amidst-plurality. In short, for 
Young, rhetoric illuminates aspects of deliberation that simply cannot be captured 
by logico-deductive argumentation processes, which underpin most theories of 
democratic deliberation. 
Seyla Benhabib published her comments on Young’s suggestions in her 
article “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” which Young 
subsequently answered in Inclusion and Democracy. The bottom line of Benhabib’s 
comment is that such forms of communication that Young sees as 
“enhancements” to a model of deliberative democracy are: 
neither necessary for the democratic theorist to try to formalize and 
institutionalize these aspects of communicative everyday 
competence, nor is it plausible--and this is the more important 
objection—to build an opposition between them and critical 
argumentation. (TDM, 82) 
 
At first glance, Benhabib seems to have rendered a sharp critique against 
Young in her comments above. She does not see how her theorization, and to a 
certain extent, resuscitation of certain forms of communication like rhetoric could 
possibly aid an already satisfactory form of political communication, deliberation 
and critical argumentation. However, as Young would quickly reiterate in her 
illuminating response in a footnote, which I will quote here in full:  
Seyla Benhabib has objected to my earlier and more sketchy 
exposition of these categories on two grounds. While greeting, 
rhetoric, and narrative are indeed aspects of informal 
communication in everyday life, she says, they do not belong in the 
public language of institutions and legislatures of a democracy. 
These should contain only shared public reasons. Benhabib seems 
here to limit the concept of political communication to the 
language of statute, which excludes most engaged activities of 
debate and discussion in mass-mediated public spheres. Her second 
objection claims that the effort to theorize greeting, rhetoric and 
narrative as modes of political communication builds an opposition 
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between these and critical argument. These modes of 
communication are irrational, arbitrary, capricious, she says and only 
rational argument contributes to deliberation. Thus Benhabib joins those 
who construct an opposition between the rational purity of 
argument and the irrationality of other forms of communication. I 
have aimed to describe the political functions of these modes of communication, 
however, as accompanying rather than alternatives to argument. They give 
generalized reason orientation and body. (emphases mine, p. 77, footnote 
31: I&D) 
 
In this rejoinder, Young clarifies a very fine point indeed. One possible 
stumbling block of a model of democratic deliberation is when it considers a 
mode of communication, argument, as solely legitimate and dismisses other 
forms. From where I see it, the hermeneutical key to understand the difference of 
their positions lies in the way they see the relationship between such purportedly 
informal means of communication as rhetoric, and the more formal language of 
dialectic.  
Young is not alone in recognizing this lack in Habermas’s discourse theory, 
which privileges logic and dialectic. William Rehg, in his essay “Reason and 
Rhetoric in Habermas’s Theory of Argumentation” articulates this as well. Like 
Young, he does not see that it is impossible to add a rhetorical level to 
Habermas’s argumentation theory. In fact, he suggests that this level is already 
present in the theory, along with the logical level (“linguistic construction” of 
argument) and the dialectical level (“competition” among arguments and 
counterarguments), albeit its role is only “extrinsic.” He sheds light on how 
allowing the rhetorical moment to be an “intrinsic” part of Habermas’s 
argumentation theory can, in fact, improve it by great lengths. For him, the main 
advantage of arriving at a “normative account of argumentation in which rhetoric 
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plays an intrinsic role” lies in rhetoric’s capacity to transform argumentation into 
what he calls “cooperative judgment formation.”59  
The essay’s conclusion is also very telling of what I suggested above in my 
understanding of Young’s suggestion: rhetoric’s emphasis on particularity. As if 
contradistinguishing his view against Habermas’s more universalistic idiom, Rehg 
uses concreteness and particularity to emphasize his point:  
By further developing such rhetorical criteria, one could provide a 
theory of argumentation with more to say about the context of 
argumentation as a process of communication. Here one must attend to 
the concrete speech situation: argumentation involves particular speakers 
who are attempting to persuade particular hearers to accept a claim on 
the basis of particular arguments. From a rhetorical perspective, 
such communication is a process of cooperative judgment formation that 
involves all three aspects: the immanent qualities of arguments and 
counterarguments, the rational grounds for trusting other 
participants’ judgments, and each participant’s capacity to judge. 
Whatever improves the quality of arguments themselves, improves 
the grounds for trusting fellow participants to cogent 
argumentation—regardless it issues in consensus (emphases mine).60  
 
In retrospect, we can surmise that if Benhabib follows her own counsel by 
rethinking Habermas’s deliberative democratic thought along the lines of Arendt’s 
pluralistic conception of speech, then she could possibly entertain a more holistic 
model of democratic deliberation, which can capture the spirit of Young’s 
suggestion: a theory of democratic deliberation which does not necessarily purges 
out rhetoric, but uses rhetoric’s passionate elements in order to ground the 
                                                 
59  See William Rehg’s essay “Reason and Rhetoric in Habermas's Theory 
of Argumentation”, in Walter Jost and Michael Hyde (eds.) Rhetoric and 
Hermeneutics in Our Time. New Haven: Yale University Press, 358-77. 
 
60  Ibid, 377. 
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discussion in specific terms that consequently illuminates the character of the 
deliberators.  
Perhaps it is appropriate to pause at this point and continue my discussion 
of the possible role rhetoric can play in democratic deliberation in the next 
chapter. We will try to answer the question: is there space for rhetoric in 
democratic deliberation? If so, what aspects of rhetoric do we ought to integrate 
with democratic deliberation? What ought to be left behind? There, I will turn 
into a re-evaluation of the last two chapters by highlighting one of the possible 
fundamental stumbling blocks of both accounts, which, up to this point, I have 
not discussed in considerable length. Both Benhabib and Mouffe can possibly 
illuminate each other’s position as I bring to the fore a latent tension in their 
theories: their conception of democratic deliberation in terms of dialectic and as 
strictly opposed to rhetoric which cements the reason/passion dichotomy. We do 
this by re-turning to Aristotle, who, as Arendt already warned us, sees the 





















THE SPACE FOR RHETORIC IN DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION  
 
 
4.1. Taking Aristotelian Rhetoric Seriously 
The 1994 publication of the proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium 
Aristotelicum entitled Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays ushered in a 
contemporary renewal of interest in one of Aristotle’s philosophically under-
assessed works.61 In this book, different distinguished philosophers explain the 
many interesting yet neglected aspects of Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric. What was 
particularly notable was the way the contributors elucidated the meaning of On 
Rhetoric vis-à-vis Aristotle’s more philosophically prominent writings such as 
Ethics, Politics and Logic. One of the keen observations of the anthology was that, 
for many years, On Rhetoric has been at the margins of Aristotelian scholarship 
                                                 
61 See Alexander Nehemas and David J. Furley’s edited collection Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) for a very 
engaging introduction to the many important reasons that demand a revival of 
interest on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This collection of essays became an important 
springboard for me to realize some of the pivotal points of this chapter, and the 
general argument of the paper as a whole. Upon reading this anthology, I realized 
that some philosophers simply dismiss rhetoric without clearly understanding its 
educative potential. The third section (Rhetoric, Ethics and Politics) is especially 
crucial to those who wish to understand Aristotle’s practical philosophy in general 
and the way that rhetoric integrates smoothly with the other two main fields of 
ethics and politics. Indeed, as the essays demonstrate, by seeing the subtle 
interconnections between language, action and thought in the realm of practical 
reason, reading Aristotle could pave the way for a theory of democratic 
deliberation. 
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precisely because the academic tradition that embraced this work’s salience lies 
outside the territorial domains of traditional philosophical scholarship.  
In my view, as many of the contributors claim as well, this neglect speaks 
less of what Aristotle’s On Rhetoric illuminates as a source for his practical 
philosophy. Rather, it points to the uneasy modern philosophical reception of the 
work, as it has been typically cast as a guide for public speaking and composition 
writing, lectured and discussed in English, Communication and Rhetoric classes 
rather than as a point of departure for understanding Aristotle in a philosophical 
context. 
In the course of my research for this thesis, I noticed that an often-
unacknowledged obstacle in the two accounts discussed in the previous chapters 
is a view that philosophy is radically divorced from rhetoric, characteristically seen 
as informed by the passions and the producer of persuasion. The 
philosophy/rhetoric divide, created from the earliest days of the history of 
political thought and handed down to the contemporary debates in democratic 
theory seems to inform and influence both accounts, albeit in different ways. This 
dichotomy, for example, very subtly frames the narrow view that reason and 
passion should not or could not interpenetrate each other. We see this divide at 
work in Chantal Mouffe’s negative description of deliberative democratic thought. 
And we also saw it in a comment, marginal as it is, of Seyla Benhabib. Now, we 
ask: is it necessary to suppose their radical opposition? Or should we view them 
instead, as Aristotle immediately and readily admits in Book I, Chapter 1 of his On 
Rhetoric that rhetoric is an antistotrophos, a counterpart of dialectic (philosophy)? 
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Both Benhabib and Mouffe rarely mentioned or borrowed from Aristotle 
in their discussion of deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. We have 
clearly seen that both of them are very much involved in debates with 
contemporary political theorists. So it seems odd, at first, to introduce Aristotle as 
mediator to these two accounts. Thence the possible objection in using Aristotle’s 
insights in theorizing about contemporary democratic deliberation: that the 
conditions of present democratic societies are widely different from ancient Greek 
states and using Aristotle to elucidate our question is anachronistic.  
My answer to this objection: I do not aim to show here that Aristotle 
possesses the clear-cut answers to our specific questions nor that he is endorsing a 
theory of democratic deliberation along the lines of our contemporary democratic 
theorists. What needs to be done, I wager, is to re-assess how we understand the 
philosophy/rhetoric debate, which can shed some light in the contours of the 
deliberative-agonistic debate I critically exposed in the last few chapters. Whether 
or not we can get rid of this divide entirely is a rather ambitious question that 
cannot be fully explored here. What we can do instead is to be attentive to some 
of the ways that this divide was initially conceived and continuously construed by 
political theorists. Aristotle’s On Rhetoric can help us in doing this. And perhaps, it 
can even instruct us on how to conceive of democratic deliberation, especially its 
relationship with rhetoric in a surprisingly new light. What is at stake is a new 
theoretical space where the strengths of the previous two accounts can be possibly 
brought together to aim at a more balanced view of democratic deliberation.  
 Before discussing Aristotelian rhetoric, in 4.2 I hope to give a very short 
excursion on the age-old quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric. I will focus on 
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two main conceptions of the quarrel, both of which are dismissive of rhetoric 
albeit in varying ways: Plato and Kant. In a sense, these two philosophers have 
greatly influenced the way most deliberative democratic theorists and their critics 
view the idea of public reason, and it is important to see what they have to say 
before we turn in 4.3 for a fuller discussion of Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric.  
 
4.2 The Age-Old Quarrel Between Philosophy and Rhetoric 
The reluctant reception(s) of Aristotle’s On Rhetoric among philosophers, 
perhaps does not only lie in its institutional connections with supposedly non-
philosophical disciplines. It goes all the way back to the split, often assumed by 
those trained in philosophy and who adhere to an ancient Platonic view in the 
Gorgias regarding the status of rhetoric vis-à-vis dialectic. In the Gorgias, Socrates 
distinguishes between two forms of persuasion: the first provides conviction 
without knowledge while the other provides true knowledge. Rhetoric, for 
Socrates, is concerned with producing conviction in its audience without 
knowledge and without reason. Unlike specific sciences such as geometry or 
mathematics, it persuades not via teaching but through mere flattery. It does not 
educate but simply corrupts and as such it depends not in the act of learning but 
in sheer conviction. Above all, it is not a proper art or a techne but only “mere 
knack.” Rhetoric is simply dismissed as an antistrophos (counterpart) to “cookery”. 
As the text puts it more clearly: 
In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part 
is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which 
knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the 
word “flattery”; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one 
of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I 
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maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art: another 
part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two 
others62 (Plato, Gorgias) 
 
 
This negative view of rhetoric figure prominently in later philosophers 
including Immanuel Kant, who, as I pointed out in the earlier chapters, largely 
influenced the view of many theories of democratic deliberation and its 
correlating idea of public reason. We read his view, for example, in the third 
Critique: 
Poetry plays with illusion, which it produces at will, and yet without 
using illusion to deceive us, for poetry tells us that its pursuit is mere 
play… Oratory [on the other hand], insofar as this is taken to mean 
the art of persuasion (ars oratoria), i.e. of deceiving by beautiful 
illusion, rather than excellence of speech (eloquence and style), is a 
dialectic that borrows from poetry only as much as the speaker needs 
in order to win over people’s minds for his own advantage before 
they can judge for themselves, and so makes their judgement 
unfree.63
 
Just like Plato, Kant used binaries in order to dismiss rhetoric. However, 
unlike Plato, who privileged philosophy over rhetoric, he cast it against poetry 
instead. Many commentators see this comment in Kant’s Critique of Judgment as 
rather unwarranted.  Brian Vickers, in his book In Defence of Rhetoric, says in 
particular: 
The dichotomy is evidently intended to privilege the poet and disarm 
the orator, who is even denied the power of movere, a particularly 
arbitrary gesture given the growth in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries…of treatises analysing rhetoric's power over the feelings. 
Kant does not enquire how the orator works, simply denies him 
seriousness or understanding, making him an intellectual entertainer. 
Continuing his demolition without examining rhetorical theory, and 
                                                 
62 See The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English with analyses and 
introductions by Benjamin Jowett, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1969). 
63 Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. W. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1987), section 53, 197. 
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without analysing a single text, he declares that the orator totally fails 
to come up with his promise, and a thing, too, which is his avowed 
business, namely the engagement of the understanding of some end. 
One might have expected a philosopher to produce an argument, or 
at least some evidence, to support such a dismissive judgment.64
 
For Plato and Kant, rhetoric or oratory is characterized as a method of 
deceiving a hearer to believe in ungrounded knowledge. It appeals to the senses 
and like poetry, “plays with illusion.” It flatters the hearer without necessarily 
delivering her a substantial piece of reason. Talking in a rhetorical fashion is like 
cooking, in the sense that both necessitate the right mix of ingredients in order to 
arouse the desires/appetites of the audience/eaters. As I see it, the core issue here, 
both for Plato and Kant, seems to lie at the epistemic status of the knowledge 
rhetoric claims to produce. Rhetoric is concerned with opinions, Dialectic with 
knowledge. And if rhetoric only aims to persuade and not arrive at knowledge like 
dialectic, then it is epistemologically suspect. If we apply this to the question of 
this thesis, we might ask: what is good in an eloquently declared sentence if it does 
not assert something of relevance and truth-value to the issue being deliberated 
upon anyway? 
From the outset, it seems reasonable to concede at this point and say that 
rhetoric has no role to play at all in democratic deliberation. It does not deserve 
the space that its defenders such as Young wish it had. Rhetoric often misses the 
point of the issue and does not necessarily enhance the decision-making process. 
This type of extreme claim presupposes that what democratic deliberators need to 
possess is a cool rational head, which produces rationally acceptable claims about 
the object of discussion. This claim somehow assumes that the deliberative agent 
                                                 
64  Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 202. 
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is almost like a professionally trained philosopher, and the deliberation ought to 
look like a philosophy seminar. In this scenario, the deliberator is always ready to 
deliberately unpack the premises that ought to lead to the conclusion of a 
particular issue. It demands a set of intellectual virtues from the political agent 
that typically makes a good philosopher: precision, clarity and soundness of 
rational argument.  
It is easy to understand why this demand underpins most theories of 
democratic deliberation. Needless to say, the crafters of the theory are mostly 
trained philosophers themselves. What seems quixotic about this assumption 
though is that in actual democratic deliberation, it seems to be unsustainable. For 
in practice, the tight distinctions philosophers tend to place between rhetoric and 
dialectic often gets blurred.  
In the next section, I will show why the Aristotelian account of rhetoric 
sheds more light rather than the simple rejection forwarded by Plato and Kant, 
and which frames the current shape of mainstream theories of democratic 
deliberation. A simple dismissal of rhetoric is not only undesirable, but also unfair 
to the possible contributions it could make to democratic deliberation. At this 
juncture, we ask: what elements of Aristotelian rhetoric could be particularly 
advantageous for a theory of democratic deliberation?  
  
4.3. Ethos, Logos, and Pathos: Three Proofs of Aristotelian Rhetoric 
In a sense, the form and content of the Aristotelian text On Rhetoric already 
instructs and points us to re-evaluate the antagonistic relation between rhetoric 
and philosophy as we read in Plato and as received by Kant and the framers and 
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critics of contemporary deliberative democratic theory. So, here, we ask the 
following questions: according to Aristotle, (1) what makes rhetoric’s structure 
similar to dialectic? (2) What makes them different? (3) What composes rhetoric? 
The aim of this part, which will attempt to answer these questions is twofold: to 
rehabilitate the relation between rhetoric and philosophy and to understand what 
elements of Aristotelian rhetoric can be useful for democratic deliberation, and to 
what extent. 65
 Most philosophical commentaries on Aristotle’s On Rhetoric immediately 
point us to the significance of its opening line, where Aristotle declares that, 
“Rhetoric is the antistrophos, or the counterpart of Dialectic.” This opening line 
is one of the treatise’s main hermeneutical keys. 66 It indicates what Aristotle will 
soon unravel: that rhetoric should not be seen as strictly opposed to dialectic. 
That in fact, dialectic, or simply argumentation could also be rhetorical and has its 
latent rhetorical aspects. Against the Platonic conception of rhetoric, Larry 
Arnhart captures this remark’s spirit very clearly: 
True rhetoric is the “counterpart” not of “cookery” but of dialectic. 
It is not an artless “knack” for persuading people; nor is it a 
collection of sophistical devices using emotional appeals for 
distracting audiences or for deceiving them with specious 
                                                 
65 I do not aim for a “comprehensive” reading of the Art of Rhetoric here. I 
will only “highlight” an extremely small part of it to illustrate the point of this 
paper as regards the desirable intertwining of reason/passion in democratic 
deliberation. Aside from Nehemas’ collection of essays, a highly recommended 
“comprehensive” contemporary discussion of this text is Eugene Garver’s 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres, 1994). 
Also, another contemporary anthology, featuring prominent philosophers would 
be the book edited by Amelie O. Rorty, Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996).   
66  The translation I use here is George Kennedy’s Aristotle’s On Rhetoric: A 
Theory of Civic Discourse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). All the references 
from the Rhetoric are from this translation.    
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reasoning. Rather, it is a mode of argument, an art of reasoning that 
consists of “proofs” (pisteis) as conveyed through the 
enthymeme…Like many other beneficial instruments, rhetoric can be 
harmful if misused. But the virtuous speaker can be trusted to apply it 
properly, and the commonsense judgments of men as expressed in 
common opinion can be depended upon in most cases to restrain 
the speaker who would misuse it (emphasis mine).67  
 
Many commentators have also raised the point that Aristotle’s On Rhetoric 
was written partly because of his fears about demagoguery or the act of emotional 
manipulation used by political leaders in their public addresses to woo the 
supposedly unthinking mob, the demos. In other words, Aristotle’s On Rhetoric has a 
corrective intent, both in the way that rhetoric was previously viewed by other 
thinkers (in Aristotle’s case, Plato) and in the way those who have political power 
misuse it.  
And after more than two thousand years, the entanglement of rhetoric 
with demagoguery seems to be very hard to split. For example, we often use the 
term “political rhetoric” to mean those words uttered by politicians who are trying 
to convince us to believe or act on an issue without any reasonable grounds. Also, 
the term “rhetoric” seeped into our literary and cultural vocabularies with the 
pejorative connotations of “empty words,” “grandiloquence” and “extravagant 
language” without the more positive aspects not captured by such uses of the 
term. Aristotle, on the other hand, points to a dimension of rhetoric without the 
burdens of its negative uses that we contemporaries usually attach to it. Contra 
Plato, he compares it to dialectic precisely because he looks at it as an art, as a 
techne, a skill that can be learned and taught, re-learned and re-taught. His treatise 
                                                 
67 Larry Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the “Rhetoric” 
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981), 34.  
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on rhetoric can then be seen as an ancient pamphlet that instructs us on how to 
proceed on public speaking with the intent of using it properly. 68  
Another lexical definition of rhetoric abundant in our contemporary 
intellectual cultures is that it can be simply defined as the “art of persuasion.” But 
Aristotle provides us a different tack: for him, the function of rhetoric “is not to 
persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case” (Rhetoric 
1.2.1355b25-6) and as an additional demand for any thoughtful person, he says 
that we ought to watch out for false claims in the course of the speech. The 
definition of rhetoric that we find in Aristotle, then is that it is “an ability, in each 
particular case” to see the available means of persuasion. This shift of emphasis 
from simply an act of persuasion to the act of seeing available means of 
                                                 
68 George Kennedy explains the meaning of dialectic for Aristotle in his 
translation of On Rhetoric. His commentary can serve as a good point of departure 
in understanding the ‘complementarity’ between rhetoric and dialectic (or 
philosophy). According to Kennedy: “Dialectic, as understood by Aristotle, was 
the art of philosophical disputation. Practice in it was regularly provided in his 
philosophical school, and his treatise known as Topics is a textbook of dialectic. 
The opening chapters of the Topics may be found in Appendix I.C. The 
procedure in dialectic was for one student to state a thesis (e.g., "Pleasure is the 
only good") and for a second student to try to refute the thesis by asking a series 
of questions that could be answered by yes or no. If successful, the interlocutor 
led the respondent into a contradiction or logically undefensible position by 
means of definition and division of the question or by drawing analogies; 
however, the respondent might be able to defend his position and win the 
argument. Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, not, as rhetoric does, by 
continuous exposition. A dialectical argument does not contain the parts of a 
public address; there is no introduction, narration, or epilogue, as in a speech--
only proof. In dialectic only logical argument is acceptable, whereas in rhetoric (as 
Aristotle will explain in chapter 2), the impression of character conveyed by the 
speaker and the emotions awakened in the audience contribute to persuasion. 
While both dialectic and rhetoric build their arguments on commonly held 
opinions (endoxa) and deal only with the probable (not with scientific certainty), 
dialectic examines general issues (such as the nature of justice) whereas rhetoric 
usually seeks a specific judgment, (e.g., whether or not some specific action was 
just or whether or not some specific policy will be beneficial).” 
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persuasion is pivotal for Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric. Because it is in this shift 
that he comes about with the three means of persuasion via speech—the so-called 
“proofs” or pisteis of persuasion.  
What are these pisteis? Aristotle answers us: “Of the pisteis provided 
through speech there are three species: for some are in the ethos of the speaker, 
and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in the argument (logos) 
itself, by showing or seeming to show something (Rhetoric 1.2.1356a1-20). He 
follows this enumeration with a further clarification as to how they intertwine 
with each other: 
It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, 
that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes 
nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character 
may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he 
possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, 
when the speech stirs their emotions…Thirdly, persuasion is 
effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or 
an apparent truth by means of persuasive argument suitable to the 
case in question. (Rhetoric, 1356a10-20, 25) 
 
 The three pisteis of ethos, pathos and logos gives us a good starting point to 
clarify as to what composes rhetoric and what makes it an attractive addition to 
deliberative democratic practice. It is through these three pisteis that we also see 
the inherent strength of the Aristotelian defense of rhetoric: it has a more 
balanced grasp of the communication process. Aristotle points out in the quote 
above that in rhetoric, as it is in dialectic, we cannot rely on logos (the speech 
itself) alone. But we cannot proceed without it either, and that in fact it should be 
seen as one of the primary elements of the process. However, by clarifying the 
need to look at the other two means of persuasion—ethos and pathos, the character 
of the speaker and the arousal of the audience’s emotions, he points to pertinent 
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aspects of political communication that seem to be under-emphasized in the 
previous discussions: the nature and status of the political agent (the deliberator 
herself) vis-à-vis the moral psychology of the listeners (the audience of the 
deliberator). By bringing ethos and pathos in the picture, Aristotle elucidates how 
the (perceived) character of the deliberator shapes her speech and how her 
character influences how the audience receives the speech.  
 Given the important role of character and the emotions in my reading of 
Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, we can then come about with a theory of democratic 
deliberation that does not necessarily leave the passionate and rhetorical elements 
of communication out of the picture, and which is more practicable than the 
account that does not recognize Aristotle’s points on rhetoric. These points, 
which I gathered from Aristotle’s On Rhetoric will also find their reverberation in 
the contemporary resuscitation of the role of rhetoric in public discourse as we 
have seen earlier in Iris Marion Young’s suggestion to “add” rhetoric in order to 
enhance democratic deliberation processes. In addition to Young, another set of 
prominent proponents of deliberative democratic theory made a recent 
“Aristotelian” turn. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, in their book Why 
Deliberative Democracy? illuminate the positive uses of rhetoric extremely well.  
First, they question whether the “style of argument” that deliberative 
democracy endorses is “biased in favor of the advantaged.” This question is 
crucial because, as we saw in Benhabib’s account of deliberative democracy, it is 
precisely one of the aims of deliberative democracy to engage individuals in 
democratic deliberation in an equal manner, giving them equal free rein of the 
discussion, its topic and as we saw later on, the decision whether or not to agree 
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to a consensus or simply arrive at an understanding of the issues discussed 
through an “enlarged mentality.”  
However, by pressing on the question of “style”, Gutmann and Thompson 
bring the issue of “communicative competence” to the fore. The fact of pluralism 
also seeps into the pluralism of expression human beings are capable of. Whether 
we are fully aware of it or not, our education may condition us to adhere to 
particular forms of expression and see other forms as simply countering other 
possibilities.  Gutmann and Thompson are cognizant that, at other times, 
deliberative democrats ought to favor other forms of speaking: 
Groups intent on challenging the status quo do not usually engage 
in the cool reason-giving that deliberative democracy seems to 
favor. Seeking to mobilize their own supporters or to gain public 
attention, they often take extreme positions and make heated 
appeals. They are more likely to use passion than reason. And for 
good reason: emotional rhetoric is often more effective than 
rational syllogism…69
 
They are quick to point out that deliberative democracy “need not assume” 
and “should not accept” a “dichotomy between passion and reason.” They 
forwarded this claim to drive the point that this dichotomy, often assumed by 
critics of deliberative democracy sees: 
…that members (or representatives) of disadvantaged groups are 
less reasonable in their appeals than their more advantaged 
counterparts. The assumption and implication are misleading. As a 
generalization, it would be hard to show that defenders of the 
disadvantaged have been less reasonable in presenting their 
arguments than defenders of the status quo. Deliberative standards 
such as being truthful and offering moral reasons are easier to 
satisfy when criticizing distributive injustices than when defending 
them. Supporters of the status quo, moreover, show no reluctance 
                                                 
69 All of the quotes (above and below) from Gutmann and Thompson 
appear in pp. 50-51 of their book Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
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to use passionate appeals… 
 
Again, it is not difficult to see why philosophical-dialectical speech seems 
to be an ideal model to proceed with democratic deliberation. The to-and-fro of 
question and answer helps us to achieve our aims of having a clearer sense of the 
topic at hand. But we cannot confine every conversation, especially in a 
deliberation that is supposedly democratic, with this model alone. Democratic 
deliberation surprises us with many forms of speech.  And as Gutmann and 
Thompson clarify above, entertaining “emotional rhetoric” can “possibly” pave 
the way for clarifying certain misconceptions regarding the supposedly unhealthy 
contamination of reason by passion. They affirm the significance of democratic 
deliberation that entertains rhetorical elements in stark terms: 
Deliberative democrats should recognize that in the political arena 
passionate rhetoric can be as justifiable as logical demonstration. Those who 
speak on behalf of the disadvantaged can ill afford to ignore the 
need to be effective. Theorists as well as politicians, at least since the days 
of Athenian politics and Aristotelian rhetoric, have recognized the legitimacy of 
modes of persuasion in politics that combine reason and passion. 
Furthermore, rhetoric may properly have to tip toward passion in 
some circumstances. Some issues cannot even reach the political 
agenda unless some citizens are willing to act with passion, making 
statements and declarations rather than developing arguments and 
responses. (Emphases mine) 
 
In the rhetorical situation, the speech illuminates the character of the 
speaker while the claims she makes are judged, as William Rehg puts it, 
“cooperatively” by the particular public audience she addresses. This insight, for 
me, is crucial because it sensitizes us on the correlation between powerful 
passionate speech and its capacity to grip its audience with precisely the source of 
this passion: its reason, so to speak. In this light, we can only think of some 
historical and political figures who used passionate rhetoric to advance the agenda 
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of the disadvantaged they are fighting for. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his “I Have 
A Dream” speech, a catalyst of the civil rights movement in the United States, is a 
brilliant example of this. Nelson Mandela’s “I Am Prepared to Die” speech sheds 
significant light, both in acute personal details and in passionate pleas for justice 
over the long struggle of South Africa with apartheid. While not explicitly set on 
intersubjective deliberative fora, these speeches points us to the power of 





















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the 
pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public 
matters;…and instead of looking on discussion as a 
stumbling block in the way of action, we think it an 
indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. 
    -Pericles, in Thucydides, The Peleponnesian War 
 
In this thesis, I attempted to look at possible responses to the question: In 
what ways can persons in a pluralistic democratic society confront, discuss and eventually solve 
their various political problems? As it should be clear by now, rendering a completely 
convincing answer to this question is an arduous task coupled with numerous 
obstacles, both theoretical and practical. This thesis primarily dealt with the 
theoretical obstacles posed by this question through an exploration of the most 
current stream of literature on democratic theory today: deliberative democratic 
theory.  
In the initial chapters, we saw how deliberative democratic theory allows 
for a response to this question by creating spaces for communication through 
critical and rational argumentation among democratic citizens regarding public 
issues. However, we also saw how this type of democratic thinking was treated 
with suspicion by others who think that we ought to suspect its main 
presupposition and perceived telos: the exchange of reasons and rational 
consensus. In the process of making analytical distinctions so as to clarify the 
subtle differences between various positions for and against deliberative democratic 
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theory, the thesis staged a theoretical debate between “deliberative democratic 
theory” and “agonistic democratic theory.”  
By carefully examining textual sources of both camps, we saw that the two 
views actually share some distinct characteristics while disagreeing on particular 
hermeneutical issues. Both camps differ on how they wish to interpret the place 
of reason in democracy and the theoretical lenses through which these 
interpretations are seen. In particular, I clarified the soundness of some 
accusations forwarded by Chantal Mouffe regarding the tasks that deliberative 
democratic theory hopes to fulfill. I teased out a feasible response towards her 
criticism through delving into the textual resources of various deliberative 
democratic theorists such as Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young. Moreover, I 
showed that, as the literature currently stands, deliberative democratic theory is a 
growing field where it is possible to construe democratic deliberation in various 
ways. From this observation, there is one main recommendation that this thesis 
made to aid the continuing development of deliberative democratic theory: to 
consider the inclusion of passions and rhetoric in understanding democratic 
deliberation. It is also in the direction of this recommendation that I wish to make 
my suggestions for further study. I wish to make at least three points: 
(1) First, the agonistic critique of deliberative democracy deserves some 
praise for raising the need to re-assess the role passions play in deliberative 
democratic theory. Mouffe, who raised this important criticism shortchanged us 
by not rendering a well-developed theory of the passions, especially on how they 
interact with the various areas of our lives in a pluralistic democratic society. In 
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this thesis, I have not fully explored a “philosophy of democratic passions” but 
this is a promising project I wish to engage with in my next inquiries on 
deliberative democratic theory. Within political theory, it is possible to make 
exegetical studies of such figures as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Sigmund Freud, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who, in their various writings 
expressed the significance of bringing back the body and the passions in our 
political and philosophical imaginations. Furthermore, to arrive at a “philosophy 
of democratic passions” useful to contemporary deliberative democratic theory, I 
think it is also crucial to inform democratic theory with insights from other sub-
disciplines within philosophy and political science. For example, cutting-edge 
researchers at the interstices of areas such as the philosophy of mind, cognitive 
science and evolutionary psychology are engaged with re-assessing the nature of 
the “embodied mind.” The insights produced by these inter-disciplinary efforts 
can possibly illuminate the somatic (“bodily”) and passionate aspects of 
democracy not easily captured by straightforward analyses and exegeses of texts 
within traditional studies of political theory and the history of political thought.  
 (2) Secondly, in this thesis, we rethought the space for rhetoric in 
democratic deliberation. I recognize that the thesis dealt with this issue in a 
limited way, choosing only a handful of theoreticians in pointing out the value of 
rhetoric per se and its decisive role in political communication in particular. By 
discussing Aristotle and pro-rhetoric deliberative democratic theorists such as Iris 
Marion Young, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, I was not able to provide 
a comprehensive discussion of the long history of disciplinary battles between 
philosophy and rhetoric that could further clarify the question why there are many 
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dismissive remarks against rhetoric among philosophically-trained deliberative 
democratic theorists. This is a very interesting project to undertake, but obviously 
a much larger task that demands intellectual training not just in philosophy and 
political theory but the proper study of rhetoric: communication.  Given the 
chance to engage with this kind of study, I wish to return to epochs in the history 
of ideas where debates regarding philosophy, politics and rhetoric became 
significant public intellectual issues. In particular, it will be interesting to make a 
full study of Aristotle’s On Rhetoric and the various receptions of this work among 
thinkers in Classical Greece, the Roman era, all the way to the modern Humanist 
period in Italy and our contemporary democratic theorists. Aristotle’s On Rhetoric 
can also be a subject of an entire study on the role of character and the emotions 
vis-à-vis persuasion in democratic deliberation.  
(3) Finally, to magnify the interplay between rhetoric and democratic 
deliberation further, we can turn to a more empirical study of actual deliberations 
and assess the extent rhetoric and rational argumentation are used in such 
situations. For example, we can focus on a single public policy and analyze the 
genealogy of its formation through the various stages of democratic deliberation 
it passed through before it reached its completion. By looking closely at the 
debates that ensued such a policy, we can determine what rhetorical and 
argumentation styles each participant in the policy-formation process used. In my 
opinion, this type of empirical study is best done with sensitivity towards the 
many theoretical issues I raised in this thesis. With such theoretical armature in 
hand, we can further analyze whether (and how) a public policy is produced 
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